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Highlights 
 We construct a dynamic competing risks hazard model. 
 We explore the joint probability of a distressed bank to fail or to be bailed out. 
 Distress is analysed based on a broad range of bank-level and environmental factors. 
 The determinants of bank failures largely differ from those of bailouts. 
 Our model outperforms the commonly used logit model in terms of forecasting 
power. 
 
Abstract 
During the global financial crisis, a large number of banks worldwide either failed or 
received financial aid thus inflicting substantial losses on the system. We contribute 
to the early warning literature by constructing a dynamic competing risks hazard 
model that explores the joint determination of the probability of a distressed bank to 
face a licence withdrawal or to be bailed out. The underlying patterns of distress are 
analysed based on a broad range of bank-level and environmental factors. We find 
that institutions with inadequate capital, illiquid and risky assets, poor management, 
low levels of earnings and high sensitivity to market conditions have a higher 
probability to go bankrupt. Bailed out banks, on the other hand, face both capital and 
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liquidity shortages, experience low earnings, and are highly exposed to market 
products; however, neither the managerial expertise, nor the quality of assets are 
relevant to the odds of bailout. We further document that large and complex banks 
are less likely to fail and more likely to be bailed out and also that authorities are 
more prone to provide support to a distressed bank, which is well-connected with 
politicians and political parties and less prone to let it go bankrupt. Importantly, our 
model outperforms the commonly used logit model in terms of forecasting power in 
all the in- and out-of-sample tests we conduct. 
 
Keywords: Financial crisis; Bailout; Failure; Dynamic competing risks hazard model; 
Forecasting.  
 
JEL Classification: C13; C53; D02; G01; G21. 
 
1. Introduction       
During the global financial crisis, a large number of banks worldwide either failed or received 
financial aid by national authorities thus inflicting substantial losses on the system. In the U.S., 
more than 500 failures have been reported since the onset of the crisis in mid-to-late 2007. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has been appointed receiver of all the bankrupt 
institutions and this has incurred a total loss of $74 billion.1 On the other hand, a costly and far-
reaching rescue plan was implemented in the U.S. financial services industry shortly after the 
outbreak of the crisis. Almost immediately after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in mid-
September 2008, the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) 
and authorised the Department of the Treasury to launch the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). Under TARP, the Treasury established the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) which was 
designed to purchase up to $250 billion of preferred stocks and equity warrants from the 
qualifying undercapitalised banks with the utmost purpose to stabilise the banking system. 
     From an economic viewpoint, the recapitalisation of banks doubled with the cost of failures 
and that of the large stimulus programmes which governments launched to revive demand led to 
the explosion of public debt in many advanced economies around the globe. Laeven and 
                                                 
1 Source: https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30&Header=1  
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Valencia (2012) highlight that episodes of banking crises result in a 23% cumulative output loss 
as well as substantial increases in fiscal debt. Indeed, fiscal problems are to a great extent 
responsible for the observed upsurge in sovereign risk in a number of economies, which put a 
further upward pressure on countries’ borrowing costs undermining in some cases the value of 
their currencies. Within this context, several borrowed countries still face considerable 
difficulties in repaying their loans or obtaining new loans from the markets as they have been 
locked out from them. By contrast, a well-functioning and robust banking sector strengthens the 
stability of the entire financial system and is a crucial determinant of economic growth. 
Therefore, the need for the development of an early warning system capable to predict bank 
distress has again come to the forefront in the relevant literature which dates back to Meyer and 
Pifer (1970), Sinkey (1975), Martin (1977), and Pettway and Sinkey (1980).  
     We contribute to the revival of the early warning literature by developing a model which, 
apart from capturing the early bankruptcy signals, it also detects the warnings for distressed 
banks which are likely to need financial support in case of a financial debacle. This is to say, the 
term ‘distress’ in our model incorporates both the concept of bank failure and that of bailout, 
which both imply a considerable burden on governments and tax payers. The two distress events 
are treated as competing events in our analysis. That is, we construct a competing risks hazard 
model where the two events are likely to occur. This is the first time that such a dual early 
warning system of distress is developed in the relevant literature. An additional innovative 
feature of our paper is that the empirical analysis is conducted within the dynamic framework 
proposed by Shumway (2001), which allows the distress probability assigned to each bank to 
vary with time. Notwithstanding its attracting features (which are discussed in detail later), the 
Shumway approach has been only marginally applied in the banking literature. Importantly, we 
explore the underlying patterns of distress based upon a broad range of bank-specific and 
environmental determinants: the financial ratios that regulators apply to rate bank performance 
and soundness, a set of systemic importance indicators, a group of key bank characteristics, and 
a set of control variables related to macroeconomic and financial conditions as well as to the 
bank regulatory environment. 
     We rely on our empirical findings to sketch out the profile of the failed and bailed out banks. 
Institutions with inadequate capital, illiquid and risky assets, poor management, low levels of 
earnings and high sensitivity to market conditions have a higher probability to go bankrupt. 
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Bailed out banks, on the other hand, face both capital and liquidity shortages, experience low 
earnings, and are highly exposed to market products; however, neither the expertise of bank 
managers, nor the quality of bank assets are relevant to the odds of bailout, implying that the 
decision of authorities to bailout a distressed institution is not significantly affected by these two 
factors. Focusing on the quality of management, our finding is rather counterintuitive if we 
consider that regulators principally aim at restoring the financial health of a bailed out bank, 
which, however, is likely to deteriorate in case of bad managerial decisions. Regarding the 
irrelevance of the quality of bank assets in the bailout decision, this is largely linked to the Too-
Many-Too-Fail (TMTF) problem, which is also evidenced in our empirical analysis. More 
specifically, we highlight that authorities are more prone to bail out a distressed bank if a crisis is 
viewed as being of systemic importance regardless of the quality of its assets.  
     Further, we document that large and complex banks are less likely to face a licence 
withdrawal and more likely to be bailed out, thus providing strong evidence on the occurrence of 
the Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) and the Too-Complex-To-Fail (TBTF) phenomena in banking. 
Moreover, authorities are found to be more prone to financially support a distressed bank, which 
is well-connected with politicians and political parties and less prone to let it go bankrupt. Taken 
together, our results confirm that the determinants of bank failures and those of bailouts differ 
from each other to a considerable extent. Importantly, the hazard model we construct 
outperforms the commonly used logit model in terms of forecasting power in all the in- and out-
of-sample tests we conduct. 
     Our study is intended for a wide audience extending from academics to policy makers and 
practitioners. Our findings offer valuable insights on how to better structure the components of 
the banking sector in order to reduce actions that have a negative effect on bank soundness and 
can harm financial stability. The competing risks hazard model à la Shumway we propose is 
considered as a key tool which can be utilised to distinguish healthy from distressed institutions 
and can work as an effective mechanism for preventing future welfare losses due to possible 
failures and bailouts in case of a financial meltdown. 
     The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the key studies on early 
warning systems in the banking literature. Section 3 presents how the dynamic competing risks 
hazard model is developed, and describes our data and the model variables. Section 4 discusses 
the in-sample estimation results and compares the out-of-sample prediction ability of our model 
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with that of the logit model. Section 5 is devoted to the robustness analysis, and Section 6 
concludes summarising the major findings of the paper. 
  
2. Related literature 
There is a broad literature on early warning signals of bank failure, which can be traced back to 
the early 1970s. A strand of this literature takes a microeconomic approach focusing on 
individual bank characteristics, whereas a second strand explains the occurrence of banking 
crises in a single- or, most of the times, multi-country setting from a macroeconomic viewpoint 
relying on institutional, legal, regulatory and other environmental variables.2 In what follows, we 
review the key studies that fall into the former literature strand, as this is the strand into which 
our study fits.  
     Several different empirical methodologies have been utilised to predict bank failure. In their 
seminal work, Meyer and Pifer (1970) apply multiple discriminant analysis to identify the 
variables that can be used to discriminate between failed and sound banks and also to predict 
bankruptcy. They include a number of performance and risk-related accounting measures in their 
analysis and show that even though embezzlement and other financial irregularities may have an 
impact on bankruptcy, accounting information can reliably discriminate bankrupt from solvent 
institutions. Sinkey (1975) also conduct a discriminant analysis, confirming that balance sheet 
and income statement measures are reliable discriminators between problem and non-problem 
banks. In a similar empirical context, Pettway and Sinkey (1980) rely on a sample of 33 large 
banks with actively-traded securities that failed over the period 1970-1975 to develop an early 
warning system that uses both accounting and market information. More recently, Cox and 
Wang (2014) resort to discriminant analysis to identify U.S. bank failures during the 2007-8 
crisis. They provide evidence that illiquid loans and the exposure of banks to the interbank 
funding markets constitute the main predictors of failure. 
     Martin (1977) conducts a discriminant analysis supported by a logit model focusing on 58 
bank failures which occurred between 1970 and 1976. The study concludes that the relevance of 
financial indicators in predicting failures varies over the business cycle: it increases during 
periods of stress, and decreases during economic upturns. Espahbodi (1991) also provides 
                                                 
2 Examples of early warning macroeconomic studies are those of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Davis and 
Karim (2008), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Lang and Schmidt (2016), Dawood et al. (2017), and Vašíček et al. 
(2017). A comprehensive survey of the relevant empirical literature is provided by Kauko (2014).  
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evidence for the ability of logit and discriminant models to identify the potential failures based 
on a set of financial ratios for 48 banks that failed in 1983 and for 48 matching solvent banks. 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997) focus on the Mexican crisis of the mid-90s to construct an 
index of bank fragility based on a logit model. Kolari et al. (1996 and 2002) use a logit model 
together with the nonparametric trait recognition technique to conduct an assessment of 
bankruptcies in the U.S. banking industry. Lanine and Vennet (2006) also apply the logit model 
and a trait recognition approach to a set of Russian commercial banks to assess what types of 
banks are vulnerable to shocks and whether or not bank-specific characteristics can be utilised to 
predict vulnerability to failures. Cole and Gunther (1998), on the other hand, forecast bank 
failures applying a standard probit model to bank accounting data, whereas Crowley and 
Loviscek (1990) classify failures amongst small U.S. commercial banks that took place in 1984 
using linear probability, logit, probit, and discriminant models. In a similar vein, Canbas et al. 
(2005) combine the principal component analysis with discriminant analysis, probit and logit 
techniques to construct an integrated early warning system that can be utilised as a regulatory 
tool for the detection of banks that experience financial difficulties.  
     More recently, Poghosyan and Cihak (2011) rely on a logistic regression analysis to examine 
bank distress in 25 EU countries. In the same modelling environment, DeYoung and Torna 
(2013) show the importance of non-interest income activities, such as securities brokerage, 
investment products and asset securitisation to the failure likelihood of U.S. banks in the 2007-8 
crisis. Berger et al. (2016) also resort to data from the recent crisis to examine the roles of 
ownership, management, and compensation structures in U.S. bank failures applying a 
multivariate logit model. Distinguin et al. (2013) use a sample of major listed banks from eight 
East Asian economies to show that both accounting and market measures are effective indicators 
of bank failures. Other recent studies that also resort to logistic probability models to predict 
failures and focus in the U.S. banking industry are those of Jin et al. (2011), Cole and White 
(2012), and Lu and Whidbee (2013). 
     Various intelligent techniques based on neural networks (e.g., Quek et al., 2009), decision 
trees (e.g., Ioannidis et al., 2010), and hybrid methodologies (e.g., Ng et al., 2008) mainly 
inspired by the operations research literature have been also applied to signal failure in the 
banking industry.3 Calabrese and Osmetti (2013) propose the generalised extreme value model as 
                                                 
3 Kumar and Ravi (2007) and Demyanyk and Hasan (2010) provide a comprehensive review of these applications. 
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a new empirical approach that can be particularly suitable for predicting binary rare events data, 
i.e., when the observed number of ones in the sample under scrutiny is very low. The approach is 
adopted by Calabrese and Giudici (2015) in the context of the early warning banking literature. 
The latter study is focused on the Italian banking sector, defining failure either as a default or as 
a merger or acquisition. It documents that Basel III capital requirements are crucial determinants 
of bankruptcy, while macroeconomic factors are relevant only in the events of mergers or 
acquisitions. Calabrese et al. (2017) extend the aforementioned approach by proposing the 
longitudinal binary generalised extreme value model, which they utilise to explore how and to 
what extent TARP reduces the failure probability of the U.S. commercial banks accounting for a 
set of macroeconomic and idiosyncratic factors. Their results show that several financial ratios, 
which are identified in the relevant literature as playing a key role in the performance and risk-
taking behaviour of banks together with the personal income growth rate can be used to predict 
distress, and that TARP provides only a short-term relief for banks. 
     The early warning literature also employs the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model in the 
assessment of the drivers of bank failures. Cox model is semi-parametric in contrast to logit or 
probit models which are purely parametric. In the Cox modelling environment, the usual 
likelihood function is replaced by the partial likelihood function. Hence, statistical inference is 
similar to that in logit and probit applications and has asymptotic properties similar to those 
based on the standard likelihood. Lane et al. (1986) offer the first application of the Cox model 
to the prediction of bank failures. By focusing on a sample of U.S. commercial banks that failed 
between 1979 and 1984, they find strong evidence about the usefulness of the model in 
providing the authorities with the likely time to failure. Whalen (1991) also relies on a set of 
U.S. banks to show that the Cox model has a high overall classification accuracy and that it can 
flag a considerable proportion of failures early. Similarly, Wheelock and Wilson (1995) use the 
same model to examine the failure probability and the characteristics of banks that fail and those 
that survive conducting a historical analysis which relies on the collapse of commodity and real 
estate prices in the 1920s. Further, Molina (2002) refers to the Cox model to estimate the time-
to-failure of the Venezuelian banks as a function of a group of bank-specific factors.  
     In the wake of the recent crisis, less than a handful of studies have turned to apply hazard 
modelling techniques to predict bank failure. Fiordelisi and Mare (2013) examine the relevance 
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of cost, revenue and profit efficiency as well as that of capital adequacy in the estimation of the 
default probability of Italian cooperative banks. They find that higher levels of efficiency and 
capital are positively related with the probability of survival, supporting the view that stronger 
capital buffers provide additional loss absorbency and reduce moral hazard problems. Ng and 
Roychowdhury (2014) analyse the incremental link between the failure probability and the add-
back component of the loan loss reserves as regulatory capital. Their results suggest that add-
backs are positively associated with failure and that this relationship holds in cases in which the 
add-backs are very likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. Mare (2015) is focused on 
Italian cooperative banks using annual financial statements and a set of macroeconomic variables 
over the period 1993-2011 to compute the hazard rate separately for bankrupt institutions and for 
those subject to merger, acquisition, and voluntary closure based on the Shumway model. 
Results show that bank failure is better captured when account for the state of the economy both 
at the national and the regional levels and that voluntary closures and acquisitions are linked to 
bank distress. 
     The studies of Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Brown and Dinc (2011) extend hazard 
analysis by proposing a competing risks hazard modelling approach, which considers mergers 
and acquisitions as competing the event of failure. Focusing on a sample of banks with more 
than $50 million of assets and use quarterly data from 1984q3 through 1993q4, Wheelock and 
Wilson (2000) suggest that the financial ratios which are used by regulators to rate bank 
performance and soundness are important determinants of both mergers and failures and that the 
competing hazard of merger is less likely when capital and earnings are higher. Brown and Dinc 
(2011) rely on a data set that consists of 21 emerging market economies to show that a distressed 
bank is less likely to be merged with or acquired by another bank or closed by the authorities if 
other banks in the examined market are weak.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
3.1. Data 
Our data are of quarterly frequency and extend from the beginning of 2003 (2003q1) to the end 
of 2009 (2009q4), which is the quarter when TARP was completed. Indeed, banks that applied 
for TARP money and received preliminary approval should have completed funding by 
December 31, 2009. We focus on the U.S. commercial and savings banking institutions that file 
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a Report on Condition and Income (also known as a Call Report). Following the relevant studies 
(see Cole and White, 2012; Cornett et al., 2013; Li, 2013; Berger et al., 2016), we exclude thrifts 
(i.e., savings and loans associations) from our empirical analysis because they file a different 
report (the Thrift Financial Report).4 Another important reason that justifies the exclusion of 
these institutions is that they operate under a different charter. A bank charter largely determines 
the activities a bank is allowed to engage in, the specific regulations it is subject to, and the costs 
it may have to incur in case of failure. Even though the main business of thrift institutions is 
similar to that of commercial and savings banks as they all accept deposits and make loans, 
thrifts are traditionally designed to serve consumers rather than corporates. In specific, they are 
specialised in mortgages and real estate lending and are required to have 65% of their lending 
portfolio tied up in consumer loans. Additionally, thrifts have a significant advantage over 
commercial and savings banks: they can borrow money from the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System at a low interest rate, which translates into higher rates of interest on savings accounts at 
thrifts as compared to other types of banks. Lastly, thrifts do not offer the range of financial 
services that is typically offered by commercial and savings banks, implying that their income 
sources and the relevant risks are not always comparable. 
 
3.2. Distressed banks  
The group of distressed banks consists of the banking firms, which either filed for bankruptcy or 
were bailed out via TARP. We acknowledge that ‘distress’ and ‘failure’ are two separate 
concepts and that failure as well as bailout can be nested in the broader category of distress. 
Whether a failure, or a bailout it is the regulatory decision to resolve a distressed institution that 
we consider in our analysis. In other words, both failures and bailouts represent a regulatory 
action. Under the latter action a distressed bank remains alive as a going concern entity, whereas 
under the former action the bank loses its charter. 
     In classifying failed and bailed out banks as distressed institutions, we rely on the formal 
definitions assigned to distress and failure in several early warning studies. As shown below, the 
literature clearly considers bailouts as one of the key resolution mechanisms in case of distress. 
That said, we follow the intuition found in Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Brown and Dinc 
                                                 
4 With the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and the establishment of the Office of Thrift Supervision in July 
2011, all thrifts were required to file and submit a Call Report from March 2012. 
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(2011) according to which the bailout of a distressed bank might prevent a failure as well as that 
in De Young et al. (2009) who argue that without the bailout a bank might have become 
insolvent.  
     According to Arena (2008), the following three categories are involved in the broader concept 
of distress: a) bank recapitalisation or liquidity injection, b) suspension of the bank’s operations, 
and c) bank closure by regulators. In a similar vein, De Young et al. (2009) define a problem 
bank either as a bank that goes bankrupt, or as one that receives regulatory assistance (e.g., a 
capital injection). Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997) also refer to the occurrence of bank 
intervention in the form of financial assistance, such as recapitalisation, to define failure broadly. 
The definition of distress in Poghosyan and Cihak (2011) relies on one of the following 
keywords: rescue, bailout, financial support, liquidity support, government guarantee, and 
distressed merger. The study of Mare (2015) defines a bank in default as one entering into 
special administration (i.e., conservatorship) under which the bank remains alive as a going-
concern entity, or compulsory liquidation which is a gone-concern action. Further, Mare states 
on p.34 that “distress may be resolved through a private solution (i.e., merger and acquisition), 
take over, bail out, or closure of the failing bank.” Calabrese et al. (2015) consider a troubled 
bank as being bankrupt, dissolved, or in liquidation, and Calabrese et al. (2017) view the 
financial assistance given to a bank by regulators as a distress event even though the institution 
remains open and its charter survives the resolution process. 
     We do not examine any banks which have been merged with or acquired by another financial 
institution. The reason is that, even though mergers and acquisitions might be due to strategic 
reasons like, e.g., the creation of scale and scope economies under normal economic conditions, 
in the case of a financial debacle, the majority of consolidated institutions are on the verge of 
distress and are seen as not being able to survive on their own. This echoes Wheelock and 
Wilson (2000)’s finding that the closer to insolvency a bank is, the more likely is its merger or 
acquisition. In the same vein, Arena (2008) provides evidence that the merged and acquired 
banks share very similar characteristics with the failed banks. Moreover, Poghosyan and Cihak 
(2011) define distressed mergers as forced mergers with healthier banks, while Mare (2015) treat 
mergers as a resolution mechanism of troubled banks. In this context, the studies of Lanine and 
Vennet (2006), Lu and Whidbee (2013), Fiordelisi and Mare (2013), and Berger et al. (2016) 
exclude merged and acquired institutions from their empirical analyses. In line with the 
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aforementioned studies, acquired banks as well as those which have been merged with some 
other institution during the crisis not at the initiative of the Federal regulatory agencies are 
considered to be a third group of distressed banks together with the failed and bailed out banks, 
which comprise the two key distressed banking groups under scrutiny in our study. As such, and 
in order to avoid any spurious effects on the examined probabilities of failure and bailout, these 
banks are excluded from our sample. 
 
3.2.1. Failed banks  
Failed banks are defined as the insured banks that were closed requiring disbursements by the 
FDIC from the onset of the crisis in mid-to-late 2007 through the end of our data period. In 
general, a bank is closed when regulatory authorities determine that it is critically 
undercapitalised and deem it unable to meet its obligations to depositors and to other creditors. 
In the event of failure, the institution’s charter is terminated and some or all of the assets and 
liabilities are transferred to a successor charter. The FDIC acts as a receiver and is in charge of 
the failure resolution process. 
     There are mainly two failure resolution mechanisms: the ‘purchase-and-assumption’ and the 
‘deposit payoff’. Under the former mechanism, insured deposits are transferred to a successor 
bank, and the charter of the failed institution is closed. In most of the purchase-and-assumption 
transactions, additional liabilities (e.g., part or all of its uninsured deposits) are assumed by and 
some or all of its assets are transferred to the acquiring bank. FDIC usually provides assistance to 
the acquirer most often in the form of loan loss sharing agreements. In the case of remaining 
assets and liabilities, these are liquidated and the liquidation costs are internalised. The acquiring 
bank usually compensates FDIC for the franchise value from the failed bank’s established 
customer relationships, which helps to reduce the insurer’s resolution cost. In a deposit payoff 
transaction, FDIC pays the failed bank’s depositors the full amount of their insured deposits, the 
bank’s charter is closed, and there is no successor institution. Typically, deposit payoffs are 
observed when no other bank is interested in assuming the assets and liabilities of the failed 
bank.  
     On 28 September 2007, NetBank was the first banking firm to fail in the U.S. in the recent 
crisis. FDIC took receivership of NetBank and all the insured deposit accounts were transferred 
to an assuming institution. Some days later, on 4 October 2007, Miami Valley Bank was also 
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shut down by the authorities. The collapse of Miami Valley Bank was followed by those of 
Douglas National Bank and Hume Bank in early 2008. Importantly, the number of failures 
increased rapidly in 2008 and 2009. In total, for the period starting from October 2007 (2007q4) 
and extending to the end of December 2009 (2009q4), there have been recorded 167 
bankruptcies in the U.S. banking sector and the FDIC has been appointed receiver of all the 
failed institutions.5 In all these failures, the purchase and assumption resolution process was 
applied, implying that deposits, assets and other liabilities were transferred to a successor bank.6 
 
3.2.2. Bailed out banks  
To stabilise the economy and the financial system, the U.S. Congress established TARP on 
October 3, 2008 and authorised the U.S. Treasury to buy up to $700 billion in troubled assets 
like mortgage-backed securities. On October 14, a revision of TARP was announced: the 
Treasury was authorised to directly inject capital into the undercapitalised banks under the CPP -
the key component of TARP- by purchasing non-voting senior preferred shares and equity 
warrants. Those injections were intended to support the participated banks through the expansion 
of their capital base and to provide stability to the system. More formally, the programme was 
“…launched to stabilise the financial system by providing capital to viable financial institutions 
of all sizes throughout the nation.”7 Therefore, based on its definition per se, TARP was a bailout 
programme that focused on banks of all sizes and not just on large and complex financial 
institutions. Qualified institutions included bank and financial holding companies, savings and 
loan holding companies, and insured depository institutions, which were established and 
operating in the U.S., and were not controlled by a foreign bank. 
     On October 20, 2008, the Treasury issued the viability criteria for the federal banking 
agencies to apply in the review of CPP applications. The criteria were based on the applicant 
bank’s examination ratings and selected performance ratios without considering potential funds 
                                                 
5 The relevant data are collected from the official FDIC web site. The names of the banks, their distribution across 
the U.S. states and cities, the date that every failed institution ceased to exist as a going concern entity, the estimated 
assets and deposits of each institution at the time of failure, and the cost of every individual failure for FDIC are all 
available upon request. 
6 To give the broad picture of the extent of bank failures in the recent crisis, we indicate that only 30 banking 
institutions went bankrupt in the U.S. from 2000 through the beginning of the crisis. 
7 For an overview of CPP, we refer the readers to the official webpage of the U.S. Department of Treasury: 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/cap/Pages/default.aspx  
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received under CPP; however, the Treasury has never issued the viability criteria publicly. After 
reviewing an application, the agency was required to submit the application and its 
recommendation to the Treasury. Based on the recommendation from the agencies, the Treasury 
was required to make the final decision on whether or not to implement the capital purchase.  
     The investment in preferred stock was determined by the Treasury and ranged from 1% to 3% 
of a bank’s risk-weighted assets with an imposed cap of $25 billion. In return for the capital 
infusion, TARP recipients subjected to: a) restrictions on their senior executive compensation 
plans and practices, b) a three-year period during which they were not allowed to repay TARP 
funds, c) a requirement to pay a dividend rate of 5% per year to the Treasury for the first five 
years and 9% afterwards as long as the securities were outstanding, and d) a requirement to pay a 
7.7% interest rate on debt instruments that was set to increase to 13.8% after five years. In 
February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act revised the TARP rules, 
eliminating the three-year period and imposing stricter restrictions on total annual compensation 
for senior executives at recipient banks in order to incentivise banks to repay or redeem the 
preferred stock at an earlier time. 
     TARP was composed of two key phases.8 In the first phase, nine of the largest U.S. financial 
institutions were arm twisted by authorities to participate in the programme. Indeed, on the same 
date that the Treasury launched CPP, the nine banks, which together accounted for 
approximately 55% of U.S. banks’ assets, announced that they would subscribe to the facility in 
a total amount of $125 billion. Those nine institutions were Bank of America, Citigroup, JP 
Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bank of New York Mellon, State 
Street, and Merrill Lynch. In the second phase of TARP, all qualified financial institutions were 
eligible to apply for financial assistance. Accordingly, participation in the first phase of the 
programme was rather mandatory, whereas, in the second phase, banks were not forced but 
chose to issue preferred stock after having voluntarily applied and being approved for issuance. 
     To construct the sample of bailed out banks, we refer to the complete list of TARP recipients 
(i.e., both voluntary and involuntary recipients) as obtained from the U.S. Treasury. This list 
discloses all the financial institutions that received TARP funds via CPP together with the 
                                                 
8 See Calomiris and Kahn (2015) for an analysis of the TARP phases.  
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respective transaction dates and investment amounts.9 We trace all banks which participated in 
the programme either directly, or through their parent holding companies (HCs, henceforth). In 
total, we identify 736 TARP investment transactions excluding any multiple transactions, i.e., 
transactions in which a bank is involved in more than once. Out of these 736 institutions that 
received capital injections, 47 were thrifts which, as earlier mentioned, are excluded from our 
analysis. This leaves 689 institutions in our sample, out of which 596 are HCs and 93 are 
commercial and savings banks. We follow Li (2013) and Croci et al. (2016) in making the 
realistic assumption that if a HC was approved to participate in TARP, its subsidiary banks 
would have received some fraction of TARP funds. Out of 596 HCs that participated in TARP, 
56 were multi-HCs, while the remaining 540 were mono-HCs. We match all HCs to their 
subsidiary banks by hand-matching the relevant information found in the Consolidated Financial 
Statements for Bank and Financial Holding Company Report (FR Y9-C Report) to the ‘higher-
holder’ codes of the examined banks found in Call Reports. In doing so, we obtain a total of 731 
banks that received TARP funds via their parent HCs. We add to this figure the 93 commercial 
and savings banks which are not linked to some HC to construct the final sample of 824 banks 
that received TARP support.10  
 
3.3. Non-distressed banks 
As already discussed, a bank either files for bankruptcy, or receives financial assistance via 
TARP. If neither of these two events occurs, and also if a bank is neither merged nor acquired, 
then the bank survives the crisis and remains in the sample up to the very last quarter of the 
examined data period. The banks falling into this category are labelled ‘non-distressed’.  
 
3.4. Sample banks 
We begin with a total number of 8,722 active commercial and savings banking institutions that 
filed a Call Report in 2003q1. Since our model relies on the competing distress events of failure 
and bailout, and since bailouts ended in 2009q4, we do not consider any failures from 2010q1 
onwards in our analysis because one of the two competing events, that of bailout, ceased to exist. 
Moreover, if we incorporate the banks that failed in 2010q1 and thereafter in our sample, then 
                                                 
9 See: https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-Investment-Program-
Transaction-Reports.aspx  
10 The detailed list of TARP banks is available upon request. 
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these banks will appear in our empirical analysis as being non-distressed since they failed at a 
point later than the end of our sample period. Therefore, we decide to exclude the banks that 
failed after the observation period.11 We also exclude all banks that were merged with or 
acquired by some other institution through a market deal. By checking the data for reporting 
errors and other relevant inconsistencies, we end up with an unbalanced data set of 7,602 banks 
of which 167 are bankrupt institutions, 824 are bailed out, and 6,611 are non-distressed. 
 
3.5. A dynamic competing risks hazard model à la Shumway 
In the context of our analysis, a bank drops from the sample either through a failure or a bailout. 
These two distress events are considered as being competing events, which introduce competing 
risks or, alternatively, competing hazards. We, therefore, resort to a competing risks hazard 
model that entails no inference methods other than those used in the traditional hazard analysis. 
     Our model examines the joint determination of the probability of a bank to fail or to be bailed 
out and relies upon a set of bank-specific and environmental time-varying covariates à la 
Shumway (2001). In contrast to standard discrete choice models like discriminant analysis and 
traditional probit and logit models, which have been extensively employed in the relevant 
literature as discussed in Section 2, the dynamic hazard model of Shumway is capable of 
incorporating information about the time which remains before an incident of distress occurs. As 
such, it can be estimated using the entire life span of information for each sample banking 
company. Consequently, its dynamic nature provides us with the advantage of examining how 
the probability of a bank becoming distressed may vary over time.  
     An additional deficiency in the applications of static prediction models is that they cannot 
accommodate the temporal concept of distress as they require the relevant process to be fairly 
stable. Being based on a dichotomous classification of distress vs non-distress which treats all 
the decision units that belong to the same group in the same manner, static models disregard the 
timing of distress in that they do not examine whether distress falls within a particular time 
window or not. That is, the distress process (either resulting in a failure or in a bailout in the 
context of our analysis) is assumed to be stable over a considerable period of time for a static 
                                                 
11 In our robustness analysis (Section 5.1), we proceed to include all the banks that failed after 2010q1 in the sample 
of non-distressed banks. 
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model specification to be run. By contrast, the time dimension of distress is incorporated into our 
dynamic empirical approach. 
     Researchers who resort to static models to predict financial distress must decide when to 
observe their sample bank’s operating characteristics. In most cases, they choose to collect year-
end data for one or two years before bankruptcy (see, e.g., Lane et al., 1986; Kolari et al., 2002). 
Therefore, static models can only consider one or maybe two sets of explanatory variables in 
terms of time for each sample entity. By arbitrarily choosing when to observe the bank 
characteristics, forecasters who use static models introduce a sort of selection bias into their 
estimates. In addition, the characteristics of banks change over time and these changes cannot be 
captured in a static empirical context. Ignoring the time-related behaviour and performance of 
banks by following a single-period classification approach based on multi-period data sets, 
implies that static models are likely to produce distress probabilities which are biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the probabilities they approximate. As a consequence, test statistics that 
are based on static models may produce incorrect inferences. 
     For all the aforementioned reasons, the forecasting power of our Shumway-type competing 
risks hazard model is expected to be generally higher than that of its static counterparts. 
Notwithstanding its attracting features, the Shumway model has been rather neglected by the 
early warning banking literature. To the contrary, the model is employed in the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy providing highly accurate parameter estimates (see Chava and Jarrow, 
2004; Beaver et al., 2005; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Campbell et al., 2008; Bonfim, 2009). 
     Failed and bailed out banks drop out from our sample the quarter that follows the date they 
went bankrupt or received financial assistance, respectively. If, for instance, a bank failed or 
received TARP funds on 26 February 2009, then this bank drops out in 2009q2. For the failed 
institutions, the reason for this is straightforward: balance sheet data are no longer available for a 
banking firm once it goes bankrupt. As regards the bailed out banks, the rationale is twofold. 
First and foremost, the money assistance that a bank receives constitutes an exogenous 
intervention in the bank’s operation which has a considerable effect on its overall performance. 
In specific, the performance of a bailed out bank is, ceteris paribus, expected to improve over 
time mainly due to the external funding received and not due to other factors which are 
endogenously linked to its performance like, for instance, the prudent and efficient management 
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of the bank. Second, once a bank is being bailed out, it can no longer be known whether or when 
that bank would fail or recover at some later point in time as discussed in Section 3.2. 
     We define the following event-specific hazard function of survival time T:  
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = lim
𝛥𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡, 𝐽 = 𝑗│𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑥)
𝛥𝑡
,                                        (1) 
 
where ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥)is the instantaneous rate of bank exit from the sample due to distress event j at 
time t given x in the presence of j-1 events, x is the vector of bank-specific and environmental 
covariates, and J is the type of distress event with j=1, 2, where 1 stands for a failure and 2 for a 
bailout. Equation (1) is the limit of the probability that a bank is dropped due to event j in a very 
small time interval (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡), given that the bank has survived to time t. As previously 
mentioned, our in-sample estimation relies on quarterly accounting data over the period 2003q1-
2009q4, implying that t stands for quarters and takes values on the closed interval [1,2,…28], 
where t=1 corresponds to the first quarter of 2003 (2003q1), and t=28 corresponds to the last 
quarter of 2009 (2009q4). Since our independent variables are observed at quarterly intervals, we 
treat each quarter as a life-at-risk interval.  
     As already noted, the occurrence of either distress event in any given instant precludes the 
other in the sense that no sample bank that received financial assistance via TARP did later fail. 
This is to say that the bailout of a bank precludes its failure and vice versa, implying that the two 
distress events are mutually excluded. Hence, the overall hazard is given by the sum of the two 
type-specific hazards: 
ℎ(𝑡; 𝑥) = ∑ ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥)
2
𝑗=1
.                                                                (2) 
 
We can now define the survival function, which demonstrates the probability that a bank 
survives longer than t:  
 
𝑆𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = 𝑃[𝑇 > 𝑡; 𝑥] =  exp [− ∫ ℎ𝑗(𝑢; 𝑥)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
].                                         (3) 
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The probability density function is given by: 
 
𝑓𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = lim
𝛥𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡, 𝐽 = 𝑗│𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑥)
𝛥𝑡
=  ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥)𝑆𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥).                         (4) 
 
Bank failures and bailouts occur at discrete points in time ijt , where i=1, 2,…, n (n=7,602) 
indexes the sample banks. We construct a dummy indicator denoted by 𝑑𝑖𝑗 which equals to unity 
if the bank i exits the sample at some point in time ijt due to any of the examined distress events 
and zero if it survives up to end of the data period. If 𝑗𝑖 stands for the distress type of bank i, then 
we can define the partial likelihood function as follows: 
 
𝐿 = ∏ ∏((ℎ𝑗𝑖(𝑡𝑖𝑗; 𝑥𝑖𝑗))
𝑑𝑖𝑗  
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑆(𝑡𝑖𝑗; 𝑥𝑖𝑗)).
2
𝑗=1
                                                    (5) 
 
We note that 𝑗𝑖does not enter into Equation (5) if 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is equal to 0; that is, 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the censoring 
term, implying that our model assumes a censored observation for each competing distress event. 
Put differently, competing hazards are treated as censored to one another: in modelling the 
hazard of failure, bailed out banks are treated as censored observations at the date of bailout. 
Similarly, in modelling the bailout hazard, banks that fail are treated as censored observations at 
their failure date.   
     We have made no functional assumptions to obtain Equation (1). Since time is continuous 
and the failure and bailout hazards remain constant over discrete time intervals (i.e., from one 
quarter to another), the piecewise exponential approach is preferable: 
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) exp(𝛽𝑗
′𝑥),                                                        (6) 
 
where ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) reflects the underlying or baseline hazard function that shows how risk changes 
over time; 𝛽𝑗
′is the coefficient vector that indicates the effects of covariates for the event type j. It 
can be shown that 𝛽𝑗
′is not the same for all j, meaning that different sets of coefficients are 
jointly estimated for different types of distress in each regression. This is in line with the 
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specification of the baseline hazard function ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) in Equation (6), which is indexed by j and, as 
such, is allowed to differ between the different distress types.  
     Following Shumway, Equation (6) can be generalised to incorporate time-varying covariates 
as follows: 
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥(𝑡)) = ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) exp[𝛽𝑗
′𝑥(𝑡)].                                                    (7) 
 
     In Equation (7), the failure and bailout hazards are assumed to be independent from each 
other. In reality, however, the two hazards are both directly and strongly related to the decisions 
of regulatory authorities and, hence, to one another. More specifically, a banking institution in 
distress either receives TARP assistance, or it is left to go bankrupt. Not only may a bank be 
more likely to be bailed out if it is in distress, but the regulators’ decision to approve or reject a 
TARP application is also linked to the individual health of the applicant bank. We, therefore, 
introduce a heterogeneity term denoted by 𝑣𝑗  in Equation (7) and obtain the following formula: 
  
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥(𝑡)) = ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) exp[𝛽𝑗
′𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑣𝑗].                                             (8) 
 
     Equation (8) allows dependence between the two types of bank exit from the sample, as it 
does not require 𝑣𝑗  and 𝑣𝑙 to be independent for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙, where l = 1, 2. We therefore allow the 
banks which are more likely to receive financial assistance for reasons which are not captured by 
our model specification to be more (or less) likely to be closed by regulators.  
 
3.6. The model covariates 
Below we describe the set of covariates x that we employ in our analysis. The underlying 
patterns of distress are investigated based upon a broad scope of factors: the components of the 
CAMELS regulatory ratings system, a set of bank-specific indicators of systemic importance, a 
group of additional key bank-specific factors, and a set of control variables related to 
macroeconomic and financial conditions. The balance sheet and income statement variables are 
of quarterly frequency and are collected from Call Reports as found in the website of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago and that of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFIEC) Central Data Repository's Public Data Distribution. Interest rates and yields are 
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collected from the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Department of Treasury and are also of 
quarterly frequency. All variables and the relevant data sources are summarised in Appendix A.  
 
3.6.1. CAMELS components 
The CAMELS rating system, which has been utilised by the U.S. authorities for more than two 
decades now to monitor the safety and soundness of individual banks, consists of the following 
six components: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management expertise, Earnings strength, 
Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. We follow the relevant literature (see, e.g., Stojanovic 
et al., 2008; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012) to construct a vector of bank performance and risk-
taking measures that largely resembles the original CAMELS components. We use the standard 
equity-to-assets ratio as an indicator of bank capital strength (CAP1); asset quality is measured 
by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and leases (ASSETQLT1); management 
expertise is measured by managerial efficiency as calculated by the input-oriented Data 
Envelopment Analysis model (MNGEXP1);12 the return on assets is applied as a measure of 
earnings strength (EARN1) and is expressed as the ratio of total net income (given by the 
difference between total interest plus non-interest income and total interest plus non-interest 
expense) to total assets; the ratio of cash and balances due from depository institutions to total 
deposits reflects the degree of bank liquidity (LQDT1); and, the sensitivity to market risk 
(SENSRISK1) is proxied by the change in the slope of the yield curve (given by the change in the 
quarterly difference between the 10-year U.S. T-bill rate and the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate) 
divided by total earning assets. 
 
3.6.2. Indicators of systemic importance 
We account for three indicators of systemic importance. The first is bank size (SIZE), which is 
measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. The second is organisational 
complexity (ORGCOMPL) proxied by the log of the product of the number of branches that each 
sample bank has and the number of U.S. states in which the bank has branches, because banks 
which are more decentralised with a greater number of branches are characterised by more 
complex organisational structures (see Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Berger and Roman, 2015). 
And the third indicator is business complexity captured by the following two measures: the 
                                                 
12 The calculation of MNGEXP1 is described in detail in Appendix B.  
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securitisation activity of the sample banks measured as the ratio of the outstanding principal 
balance of loans, leases, and all relevant assets securitised and sold to other financial institutions 
with recourse or other credit enhancements to total assets (SECASSET); and the exposure of 
banks to financial derivatives markets as reflected in the ratio of the total amount of outstanding 
derivative contracts to total equity capital (DERIV). The numerator of DERIV includes the 
interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodity and other derivative contracts that are held 
either for trading or hedging purposes.13 Both SECASSET and DERIV rely upon the Bank for 
International Settlement methodology for the designation of globally systemically important 
banks that measures complexity using the notional value of Over-The-Counter (OTC) 
derivatives, the balance sheet presence of “Level 3” assets (i.e., assets for which prices cannot be 
inferred by either markets or models), and the size of the trading and available-for-sale securities 
(BCBS, 2014). 
     It is worth mentioning that commercial banks diversified away from the traditional 
intermediation services of deposit-taking and loan-granting into market-based products like 
securitised assets and financial derivatives in the years running up to the crisis,. The observed 
growth in this sort of products which mainly generate non-interest income and are commonly not 
reported on banks’ balance sheets has been widely recognised in the literature as considerably 
altering the risk profile of banks (De Jonghe, 2010; Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach et al., 
2012; Acharya et al., 2013; Battaglia and Gallo, 2013; Chaffai and Dietsch, 2015; Kohler, 2015). 
Literature has also documented the relevance of such activities in bank performance (e.g., 
Rogers and Sinkey, 1999; Casu and Girardone, 2005) and in the probability of failure (see, 
among others, Lepetit et al., 2008; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Van Oordt, 2014). Even though 
securitised products and financial derivatives have had a quiet few years (mostly from 2008 to 
2011), a resurgence of these and other relevant trading activities has been lately observed (Boot 
and Ratnovski, 2016; Le et al., 2016; Buchanan, 2017). It is therefore crucial to investigate the 
effects of this type of complex business on the likelihood of a bank to fail or to need financial 
assistance in the context of our early warning system. Therefore, we use SECASSET and DERIV, 
which capture the scope and diversity of bank business lines.  
 
                                                 
13 Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) study how the complex market-based activities like financial derivatives affect the 
overall risk profile of banks as well as the level of systemic risk.  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
22 
 
3.6.3. Additional key bank-specific variables  
The TARP literature has demonstrated that connections with regulators and policy makers have a 
considerable impact on the decision of authorities to save a bank through the extension of a 
TARP facility. We use a group of variables to capture these connections. First, we follow Blau et 
al. (2013) and resort to the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP)’s Revolving Door database to 
construct an indicator variable (POLCON) to proxy the connections that our sample banks is 
likely to have with policy-makers. POLCON is equal to unity if a bank has employed, or is 
currently employing an individual who is also employed or has been employed in the federal 
government or appointed to a government advisory board, a congressional or presidential cabinet 
entity, or an independent commission. Second, we identify any connections that banks may have 
with regulatory and supervisory authorities. We follow Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), 
Duchin and Sosyura (2012), Li (2013), and Berger and Roman (2015) to construct an indicator 
variable (FEDCON) that is equal to unity if an executive at a bank was on the board of directors 
of one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks or one of their branches either in 2008 or 2009. We first 
obtain the relevant data on the top executives of our sample HCs from BoardEx and then match 
them to the list of directors from the Fed’s website. Third, we use House of Representatives 
Committee data and follow Duchin and Sosyura (2014), Ignatowski et al. (2015), and Berger and 
Roman (2015) to construct a dummy variable (COMMIT) that equals one if a sample bank is 
headquartered in a district of a House member who served on the key finance committees 
involved in drafting and amending TARP, i.e. the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, or the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets of the House Financial Services Committee either in 2008 or 
2009. We resort to data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Library of Congress to match 
the sample banks with the relevant congressional districts using the zip codes of their 
headquarters. And, forth, as an additional measure of the ties that possibly exist between the 
financial services industry and politicians, we refer to the contributions of banks to federal 
political campaigns (CAMP). We collect data from the Federal Election Commission that cover 
contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) to candidates’ election campaigns. 
Following Duchin and Sosyura (2012), Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), and Ignatowski et al. 
(2015), CAMP takes the value of one if a bank has made PAC contributions in the election cycle 
for the 2008 congressional election to the members of the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions or to members of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets. 
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     A number of bailed out banks played the role of acquirers in the merger and acquisition 
(M&A) deals that took place during the examined period but, mainly, after the outbreak of the 
crisis. We, therefore, resort to the relevant files of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago to 
investigate whether a bank has been involved in a M&A transaction as acquirer.14 We introduce 
a dummy variable (MA), which is equal to unity when the acquirer bank i is involved in a M&A 
transaction and remains equal to one until the end of the data period. For example, if an 
acquisition occurred on April 15 2008 then this transaction is recorded in the second quarter of 
2008, meaning that MA takes the value of one in 2008q2 and remains as such for all the 
subsequent quarters.  
     Further, we introduce a dummy indicator (MSA) to account for regional disparities that may 
have an impact on the failure/bailout probabilities. MSA is equal to one if a bank is located in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (i.e., an integrated economic and social unit with a recognised large 
population nucleus) and zero otherwise. The geographical location of each sample bank is 
identified through Call Reports; detailed data for Metropolitan Statistical Areas are taken from 
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 
     It is well-documented in the banking literature (see, e.g., DeYoung, 2003) that the behaviour 
and performance of the newly chartered banks substantially differ from those of banks in 
operation over a rather long period of time. More specifically, once a bank first enters the 
market, its financial performance tends to lag by a considerable margin compared to that of the 
existing banking firms. That said, we account for the so-called de novo banks, defined as banks 
less than five years old by including the relevant dummy (DENOVO) in our model. 
     We also construct an indicator variable (PUBLIC) that shows if a bank is listed on the stock 
exchange market. Since the decision-making units we examine are not holding companies, the 
subsidiaries of publicly traded HCs are considered to be public. Banks with private placements 
of shares with a Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number, 
banks without a stock exchange listing, and banks whose HC is not listed on the stock exchange 
are treated as non-public. The data on trading and listing are derived from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. A dummy variable (HC) showing whether a 
sample bank is a subsidiary of a HC is also considered in our empirical analysis.  
 
                                                 
14 The relevant data are found in: https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/merger-data  
AC
CE
PT
ED
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
24 
 
3.6.4. Macroeconomic and financial variables  
After the outbreak of the crisis, the ability of banks to lend to each other via the interbank market 
or to borrow from money markets was considerably reduced. This gave birth to liquidity 
shortages, which generally occur when a bank is unable to meet its current obligations as they 
come due. In efforts to bolster banks that were constrained in obtaining new funds and to boost 
cash flow in the market through the support of credit supply with the utmost purpose to avoid a 
more severe credit crunch and to help ease the crisis, the Fed (like other Central Banks 
worldwide) implemented several successive rounds of quantitative easing programmes mainly 
through the purchase of Treasury securities. We, therefore, introduce a dummy variable (QE) to 
capture the first quantitative easing round in the U.S., which extended from November 2008 to 
June 2010. QE takes the value of 1 in 2008q4 and remains unchanged until the end of our sample 
period to indicate that the programme was in place in each and every of the subsequent quarters. 
     Authorities may find it optimal in terms of economic and social costs to bail out a bank which 
is in distress instead of closing the bank if there are too many distressed financial institutions in 
the economy. That is, regulators may become reluctant to let a bank fail once a crisis is 
considered to be of systemic nature. Following Brown and Dinc (2011), we account for the Too-
Many-To-Fail effect in bank regulation using a measure of the relative capital soundness denoted 
by TMTF. This is obtained as the average capital ratio (total equity capital to total assets) of 
other banks in the economy weighted by bank total assets.  
     It is widely accepted that economic performance has a considerable impact on demand and 
supply of financial services. More precisely, high levels of banking activity are generally related 
to favourable economic conditions like price stability and economic development. In this 
context, the macroeconomic environment is largely considered to have an effect on the 
performance and the risk-taking of banks. Hence, we employ the quarterly change in the U.S. 
Consumer Price Index (INF) to control for fluctuations in the level of prices, and the GDP output 
gap (GDP) to control for variations in economic growth.  
 
3.7. Summary statistics  
3.7.1. CAMELS and systemic indicators 
In Table 1, we present and discuss the summary statistics on CAMELS components (CAP1, 
ASSETQLT1, MNGEXP1, EARN1, LQDT1, and SENSRISK1), and systemic indicators (SIZE, 
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ORGCOMPL, SECASSET, and DERIV) for the three groups of banks. Further, we make pairwise 
comparisons of the performance, financial soundness and systemic importance among the three 
groups by conducting a univariate analysis on the mean differences of the aforementioned 
variables. We rely on average quarterly data over the pre-crisis period, i.e., from 2003q1 to 
2007q3. The fourth quarter of 2007 (2007q4) is considered to be the starting point of the crisis 
for two main reasons: first, bank failures begun to unravel in the very beginning of that quarter; 
and, second, that was the time when the TED spread (i.e., the difference between the yield on the 
three-month London Interbank Offered Rate -LIBOR- and the yield on three-month U.S. T-bills) 
which is one of the most widely used indicators of credit risk, widened to almost 200 basis points 
relative to a historically stable range of 10-50 basis points. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
     We notice that non-distressed banks were on average well-capitalised in the years preceding 
the crisis with a mean equity capital ratio (CAP1) of 12.63%. The mean value for the capital 
ratio of failed banks was equal to 10.17%, while that of bailed out banks was 9.23%, showing 
that the latter group experienced a relatively lower capital adequacy compared to its peers prior 
to the crisis. The reported mean differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Turning to examine the asset quality indicator (ASSETQLT1), figures reveal that the asset 
portfolio of non-distressed banks was the least risky compared to the relevant portfolios of the 
other two groups. In specific, the mean of ASSETQLT1 was equal to 0.58% for non-distressed 
banks, 1.40% for failed banks, and 1.92% for bailed out banks. Therefore, failed banks 
experienced a better asset quality if compared to that of bailed out banks as they had 0.52% less 
non-performing loans compared to the assisted institutions. The pairwise differences in means 
for ASSETQLT1 are all significant at the 1% level. Moreover, non-distressed banks shared very 
similar managerial efficiency scores (MNGEXP1) with failed banks (0.79 and 0.77, 
respectively); the reported difference of 0.02 points is found not to be statistically significant. 
On the other hand, the management of bailed out banks is found to be less efficient by 0.15 
points and 0.13 points than that of non-distressed and failed banks, respectively; the reported 
mean differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. Focusing on EARN1, we observe 
that bailed out banks were the least profitable banks amongst the examined institutions prior to 
the outbreak of the crisis: they earned 0.67% less than non-distressed banks and 0.13% less 
than failed banks. Both mean differences are significant at the 1%. Further, the profitability of 
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failed banks was significantly lower if compared to that of non-distressed banks. In specific, 
failed banks earned 0.54% less than non-distressed banks. As regards the mean liquidity ratio 
(LQDT1), this was equal to 4.74% for non-distressed banks, 3.01% for failed banks, and 2.01% 
for bailed out banks. That is, failed banks held fewer liquid assets than non-distressed banks, 
while bailed out banks held the most illiquid portfolio of assets amongst their peers. The 
corresponding mean differences are all significant at the 1% level. To continue, non-distressed 
banks were, on average, almost equally sensitive to market risk with failed institutions with an 
average SENSRISK1 of 10.77% and 10.68%, respectively. The reported mean difference of 
0.09% is found not to be statistically significant. On the other hand, the average sensitivity of 
bailed out banks to market risk was equal to 17.18%, revealing that this group of banks was 
highly exposed to market-based activities. The relevant mean differences (-6.41% and -6.50%) 
are significant at the 5%.  
     Importantly, non-distressed banks had almost the same average size (SIZE) with the failed 
institutions: $0.86 billion and $0.89 billion, respectively. The mean difference of $0.03 billion 
is not statistically significant. Bailed out banks, on the other hand, had a size of $9.98 billion, 
being, on average, more than 11 times larger compared to either the non-distressed or the failed 
banks. The relevant differences in the means of SIZE are found to be highly significant. As 
regards the organisational complexity (ORGCOMPL) of the three groups of banks, bailed out 
banks are found to be the most complex ones (1.64), whereas non-distressed banks are the least 
complex institutions (1.19). Notably, the level of organisational complexity of failed banks 
(1.40), even though it is lower by 0.24 compared to that of bailed out banks, it is not 
substantially different from a statistical viewpoint. Turning to the business model complexity, 
the banks that went bankrupt are found to have been engaged in securitisation activities to an 
almost equal degree with non-distressed banks in the years preceding the crisis. More 
concretely, the mean proportion of SECASSET is equal to 10.23% for non-distressed banks. 
This percentage is only 0.34% higher compared to that of failed banks (9.89%) and the reported 
difference is not statistically significant. To the contrary, the asset securitisation business of 
bailed out banks is heavier compared to that of both non-distressed and failed institutions with 
a mean value which equals to 17.32%. The mean differences of -7.09% and -7.43% with non-
distressed and failed banks respectively are statistically significant at the 1% level. If we now 
turn to examine the exposure of the three banking groups to derivative products (DERIV), the 
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picture we obtain is very similar to that obtained for securitisation activities. In specific, we do 
not document any significant differences -either from a numerical or a statistical viewpoint- in 
the involvement of either the non-distressed or the failed banks with derivative activities. On 
the other hand, the mean value of DERIV for the assisted institutions equals to 21.63%, which 
is 13.49% and 13.70% higher than the relevant means for the groups of non-distressed and 
failed banks, respectively. The reported mean differences are both highly statistically 
significant. 
     Taken together, the performance, size, and business complexity of bailed out banks were all 
significantly different from those of their peers during the pre-crisis period: they were much 
larger institutions, which experienced lower capital ratios, riskier portfolios of assets, weaker 
managerial efficiency, lower profitability, increased illiquid assets, higher degree of sensitivity 
to market risk, and considerably heavier exposure to non-traditional banking business. On the 
other hand, the banks that went down during the crisis, even though they performed worse than 
those that remained afloat in terms of capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability, and 
liquidity, had almost the same size with their non-distressed peers and also shared some 
common features with them like management quality, the level of sensitivity to market risk, 
and the degree of engagement with non-traditional products. As regards the organisational 
complexity, bailed out banks demonstrated a more complex structure compared to that of the 
non-distressed banks, but not so highly different structure from a statistical perspective 
compared to that of failed institutions. 
 
3.7.2. Additional bank-specific variables 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the additional bank-specific variables we employ in 
our analysis. Several substantial and statistically significant differences between failed and 
bailed out banks are reported. We find that POLCON is significantly larger at the 1% level for 
banks that received TARP money than those closed by regulators. Specifically, 7.38% of bailed 
out institutions have employed, or are currently employing at least one individual, who is 
affiliated or has been affiliated with the federal government or some other cabinet entity; the 
relevant percentage for the failed banks is only 1.70%. Similarly, if we turn to examine 
FEDCON, we observe that TARP banks are more closely linked to Fed regulators and 
supervisors compared to their failed peers (6.31% and 1.81%, respectively). The difference in 
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the means is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Further, 9.36% of the TARP 
banks and 2.94% of the failed banks are headquartered in a district of a House member who 
served on the key finance committees (COMMIT); the reported difference is significant at the 
5% level. Regarding the contributions of the two groups of banks to federal political campaigns 
(CAMP), 5.42% of TARP banks and 1.35% of the failed banks made such contributions and the 
relevant difference is significant at 1%. 
     An average of 27.24% of bailed out banks have been involved in at least one M&A 
transaction as acquirer during the sample period, whereas the relevant percentage for failed 
banks is only 2.80%. The difference in the means of MA for the two groups of banks is 
significant at the 1% level. To continue, 41.93% of failed banks are located in a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA). The relevant percentage for banks that were bailed out is significantly 
higher at the 5% level and is equal to 71.41%. An additional considerable difference of failed 
banks compared to bailed out banks is that more than twice of the former group are newly-
chartered banks (DENOVO) compared to the latter group (8.07% vs. 3.20%, respectively), and 
that the reported difference in means is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the summary 
statistics for PUBLIC show that 2.78% of failed banks are listed, while the relevant percentage 
for bailed out banks is 7.56%; the reported mean difference is significant at the 1% level. 
Lastly, 10.62% of the failed banks are, on average, affiliated with a holding company (HC). 
The corresponding percentage for the assisted institutions is much higher and equals to 62.68%; 
the difference in the means is significant at the 5% level. 
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
3.8 Bank distress 
In Section 3.7, we showed that the average performance of failed and bailed out banks based on 
CAMELS components is relatively worse compared to that of non-distressed banks over the pre-
crisis years. We now move a step further in our analysis and measure the level of distress of our 
sample banks using Z-score as a proxy for distress. Z-score is calculated for each sample bank 
and for each sample quarter as follows:15  
 
                                                 
15 The interested reader is invited to consult the relevant literature on the computation of time-varying Z-score (e.g., 
Lepetit and Strobel, 2013 and 2015).  
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𝑍𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁1𝑖𝑡+𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝛦𝛢𝛲𝛮1𝑖𝑡)
                             (9) 
 
where t stands for quarters, i for the sample bank i, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 denotes Z-score for bank i at t, and 
𝜎(𝛦𝛢𝛲𝛮1𝑖𝑡) is the period standard deviation of EARN1 which captures the volatility of bank i’s 
returns. Z combines profitability, capital risk, and return volatility in a single measure. Evidently, 
it is increasing in banks’ average profitability and capital strength and decreasing in return 
variability. Overall, larger values of Z imply lower levels of distress. 
     We measure Z-score for each sample bank and for each quarter during the crisis period. We 
focus on this period because this is the time when all failures and bailouts occur. In the case of 
failed and bailed out banks, Z-score is measured for each quarter prior to the failure or bailout 
quarter, respectively. We then compute a summary (average) Z-score for each sample bank over 
the examined period and assign each Z-score to a decile. We sort all banks in deciles based on 
their summary Z-scores. The number of banks as well as the relevant percentage for each of the 
three banking groups by decile of distress is calculated and reported in Table 3. Banks in the top 
10 percent (i.e., in Decile 1) achieve the highest Z-scores which stand for the lowest levels of 
distress; banks in the lowest 10 percent (i.e., in Decile 10) have the lowest Z-scores which reveal 
the highest distress levels. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
     As expected, the great majority of failed banks were in distress prior to their failure. In 
specific, 68.26% of the banks that filed for bankruptcy during the crisis achieved the lowest Z-
scores, while 17.37% achieved the second lowest scores. Not surprisingly, the group of non-
distressed banks confirms its soundness since only 2.07% and 1.44% are ranked in the lowest 
two deciles, respectively. The banks that received TARP funds, on the other hand, are found to 
be in distress prior to their recapitalisation: three out of four bailed out banks (75.85%) belong to 
the lowest two deciles, while only 5.71% belong to the top two deciles. The latter percentage 
possibly reflects that some non-distressed banks with lower capital ratios were at competitive 
disadvantage to raise equity due to market conditions, and, hence, have applied for a cheaper 
source of funding.16 However, the great majority of bailed out banks is found to be in distress, 
which is consistent with the relevant findings and discussions in the TARP literature. For 
                                                 
16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for offering this insight. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
30 
 
example, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) document that banks that faced high financial 
distress costs obtained TARP equity infusions. Brei et al. (2013) suggest that recapitalisations 
can help sustain credit in the economy by helping banks to survive extreme distress and that 
TARP institutions were those facing serious financial distress. Li (2013) also describes TARP 
banks as being financially distressed. Similarly, Cornett et al. (2013) underline the key TARP’s 
goal of helping temporarily unhealthy banks get through a period of financial distress. 
 
4. Regression results 
4.1. In-sample estimation: Dynamic competing risks hazard model 
We use non-distressed banks as the holdout banking group and estimate two different 
specifications of Equation (8): one specification that considers the CAMELS components and 
the indicators of systemic importance (columns 1a and 1b in Table 4), and a second one which 
also accounts for the additional bank-specific factors and the environmental variables (columns 
2a and 2b in Table 4). The coefficients for the two types of distress are jointly estimated under 
both model specifications. A positive (negative) sign indicates an increase (decrease) in the 
failure/bailout likelihood given that the bank has survived up to that particular point in time. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
     The results show robustness across the two model specifications: the signs of the estimated 
coefficients remain the same and the statistical significance levels of the coefficients are very 
similar (if not the same) across the two specifications. The impact of bank capital (CAP1) on 
failure and bailout probabilities is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that banks with a stronger capital base are less likely to fail, and also less likely to be bailed out. 
Put differently, banks which are highly levered are more likely to either go bankrupt, or to 
receive financial support by authorities given that they have stayed afloat up to the point in time 
that authorities will make the relevant decision. Higher credit risk as reflected in ASSETQLT1 
significantly increases the probability of a bank to fail; on the other hand, the impact of 
ASSETQLT1 on the odds of bailout is not statistically significant. The expertise of bank 
managers (MNGEXP1) has a significantly negative effect at the 5% level on the hazard of 
failure, but no statistical impact on the bailout hazard. Hence, the quality of bank management 
and that of assets are found to be independent from the decision of authorities to bailout a 
distressed institution. This implies that a distressed bank is likely to receive financial aid 
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regardless of the quality of its management and portfolio of assets. This is rather counterintuitive 
if we consider that by providing financial assistance to a distressed institution regulators 
principally aim to restore its health. However, the health of an assisted institution may eventually 
deteriorate in case of bad managerial decisions, or in the case of a large volume of risky assets in 
its portfolio.17 As expected, more profitable banks (EARN1) as well as those that hold a larger 
portion of liquid assets (LQDT1) in their portfolios have lower failure likelihood; the latter 
findings are highly significant. Similarly, the relationship that holds between profitability and the 
level of liquidity with the bailout likelihood is negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Lastly, sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK1) is found to have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on both the failure and bailout probabilities. 
     We can now turn to examine how the indicators of systemic importance influence the two 
probabilities under scrutiny. Bank size (SIZE) is found to be negatively linked to the failure 
probability, which implies that smaller banks are more likely to go bankrupt. Larger banks, on 
the other hand, have higher chances to receive financial assistance. Both effects are statistically 
significant at the 1% level across the two model specifications. These findings are in line with 
the main argument of Goodhart and Huang (2005) according to which it is optimal for authorities 
to rescue those banks whose size is above some threshold level. Importantly, our findings 
provide strong support to the Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) phenomenon: it is in the interest of bank 
managers to shape and follow strategies that focus on the size growth of their banks knowing 
that the bigger their bank becomes the more likely is to be bailed out and the less likely is to fail 
in the case of financial turbulence. 
     As regards the organisational complexity of banks (ORGCOMPL), this is negatively 
associated with the probability of failure and positively linked to the odds of bailout across the 
two model specifications. The estimated coefficients on ORGCOMPL are significant at either the 
5% or the 10% levels. Hence, we can argue that the more complex the organisational structure of 
a bank is, the more likely is to receive TARP assistance and the less likely is to fail. This holds 
also true if the business model complexity is considered. The coefficients on both SECASSET 
and DERIV are found to be highly statistically significant, showing that securitised assets and 
derivative products can bestow substantial benefits on banks by allowing risks to be more 
precisely tailored to risk preferences and tolerances of banks and their customers. Both 
                                                 
17 We thank an anonymous referee for this observation. 
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instruments increase the capacity of banks to price and bear risk and to allocate capital. In 
addition, the results imply that the combination of traditional banking products with modern 
activities transforms risks and reduces the odds of failure.  
     There are at least two channels through which product diversification leads to a reduction in 
bank riskiness. The first shows that non-interest income, which is produced by non-traditional 
financial instruments, is less sensitive to changes in the economic and business environment than 
interest income, which is produced by traditional products like real estate, commercial, industrial 
and other types of loans. Therefore, banks which rely more on the former type of income are 
typically exposed to less risk as they manage to reduce the cyclical variations in profits and 
revenues. Turning to the second channel, in case there is a negative or a weak correlation 
between the above two sources of income, then according to the traditional banking and portfolio 
theories (Diamond, 1984) any observed increase in the share of fee-generating business in the 
overall portfolio of banking items reduces the volatility of total earnings via diversification 
effects. As a consequence, the level of bank riskiness is reduced. In sum, our results for 
SECASSET and DERIV are in line with the effect that Instefjord (2005) highlights according to 
which banks can achieve enhanced risk-sharing and risk diversification through their exposure to 
derivative markets. Results also provide support to Van Oordt (2014), who documents that 
securitisation contributes to a fall in the likelihood of individual bank failure as well as to Wu et 
al. (2011), who show that securitisation reduces the overall risk of banks. 
     On the whole, banks which are perceived as TBTF are also Too-Complex-To-Fail (TCTF). 
Large banking institutions are considered by authorities as being universal banks in the sense 
that they follow a more decentralised organisational structures and are exposed to all kinds of 
products. Further, these institutions are viewed as being of high importance for the stability of 
the financial system. This is in contrast to what holds for small and medium-sized banks, which 
are less decentralised and mainly focus on the activities of deposit-taking and loan-granting. This 
overall finding is in line with Hakenes and Schnabel (2010), who show that small banks which 
are not considered by authorities to be systemically important turn to take higher risks thus 
increasing their probability of going bankrupt. This phenomenon is more pronounced when the 
bailout likelihood of the large banks which are protected by the system is increased. 
     We can now sketch out the profile of banks which are more likely to fail as well as that of 
banks which are more likely to receive assistance in the case of financial debacle. Regulators are 
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more likely to close a bank if it has inadequate equity capital, illiquid and risky assets, poor 
management, low levels of earnings, and high sensitivity to market risk. However, not all the 
aforementioned factors are related to the probability of a bank to be bailed out. The decision to 
keep a bank afloat is affected by the capital strength of the scrutinised bank, its earnings profile, 
the liquidity degree of its portfolio, and its sensitivity to market risk. Credit quality and 
management expertise do not significantly influence regulators in their decision to save a 
distressed bank. Crucially, a small bank with a simple organisational structure that follows a 
traditional model of business based on deposits and loans is more likely to fail. On the other 
hand, a large banking firm with a sophisticated organisational structure which heavily relies on 
non-traditional banking products to finance its operations has a higher chance to be bailed out. 
All in all, our results show that the determinants of failures differ from those of bailouts, 
implying that authorities treat a distressed bank differently in their decision to let it fail or to bail 
it out. 
     We now turn to examine the effect of the additional bank-specific variables and that of the 
environmental variables on the failure and bailout likelihoods by focusing on columns 2a and 2b 
of Table 4. A bank’s political connections (POLCON) exert a significantly negative impact on 
the failure hazard as they lower the relevant probability; on the other hand, POLCON is found to 
increase the bailout probability. Along the same lines, we document that when a bank is more 
closely connected to regulators (FEDCON) then its failure (bailout) probability is significantly 
reduced (increased). Moreover, connection to a House member who serves on the finance 
committees involved in drafting and amending TARP (COMMIT) is associated with a 
statistically significant reduction (increase) in the likelihood of failure (bailout). Further, our 
results reveal that contributions to political parties campaigns (CAMP) significantly lower 
(boost) the chance of a bank being let to fail (being bailed out). Overall, our results are in line 
with Dunchin and Sosyura (2012), who suggest that the connections of distressed banks with the 
political and regulatory authorities was a major determinant in the distribution of TARP funds. 
By the same token, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) find that TARP infusions were provided 
to those banks that posed systemic risk, faced high expected financial distress costs, and were 
politically well-connected.  
     When a bank is involved as an acquirer in a M&A transaction (MA), this significantly reduces 
its failure likelihood. However, MA has no statistically significant impact on the bailout 
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probability. To continue, if a bank is located in a MSA, then it is less likely to fail and more 
likely to receive financial assistance. The latter finding is confirmed by the geographical 
characteristics of our data set. Many failed banks are located in rather distant, sparsely populated 
geographical districts, and concentrate their activities in the mainland close to rural states like, 
for instance, Iowa, Nebraska, or Utah. On the other hand, most of the Northeastern and 
Southeastern states (excluding California) which constitute large parts of MSAs have a few bank 
failures and a large number of bailouts. As regards newly-chartered banks (DENOVO), these are 
found to be more likely to fail; however, the age of a bank does not have any statistically 
significant impact on the bailout hazard. Further, a bank which is publicly traded (PUBLIC) is 
less likely to fail, but more likely to receive financial assistance. This result is in line with the 
reported effect of SIZE as discussed above: larger banks are those which are typically publicly 
traded in contrast with their smaller counterparts which are not listed on the stock exchange 
market. Lastly, there is no statistically significant association between a bank which is a HC 
subsidiary (HC) and the probabilities under scrutiny. 
     Our results provide strong support to the TMTF effect. If the decision of authorities to close 
or to bailout a distressed bank is based exclusively on that bank’s health, then the TMTF variable 
should not be significantly related to any of the examined probabilities. By contrast, we find that 
TMTF has a positive (negative) and highly significant impact on the failure (bailout) likelihood. 
Taken together, we claim that, after controlling for individual bank characteristics and other 
relevant factors, regulators are inclined to financially support a distressed bank to remain afloat 
instead of letting it go bankrupt in case there are too many banks in distress in the economy. This 
is in line with the irrelevance of the quality of bank assets (ASSETQLT1) to the bailout likelihood 
as reported earlier.18 In specific, authorities are more prone to bail out a distressed bank if a crisis 
is viewed as being of systemic importance regardless of the quality of its assets. 
     Regarding the impact of the environmental variables, we document that the level of economic 
activity (GDP) has a statistically negative impact on the failure probability. This suggests that 
negative GDP growth enhances the chances for a bank to fail. On the other hand, the impact of 
GDP on bailout probability is not statistically significant. A higher inflation rate (INF) is 
significantly associated to a higher risk of failure, whereas no significant relationship is reported 
between INF and the bailout hazard. To continue, QE is found not to significantly affect the 
                                                 
18 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to relate bank asset quality with the TMTF problem. 
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hazards of failure and bailout. Even though the quantitative easing programmes are designed to 
inject liquidity in banks and in the economy, to improve asset quality and, in turn, to boost bank 
profitability through an increase in capital gains, they do not seem to have a direct impact on the 
examined probabilities in the context of our analysis.  
 
4.2. In-sample estimation: Dynamic competing risks hazard model vs logit model  
We compare the forecasting power of our model with that of the static logit model which is 
commonly used in the relevant literature. The posterior probabilities of failure and bailout can be 
derived directly from the following logit model specification:  
 
log (
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗
1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑔𝑥𝑔,𝑖𝑡−3,                                                        (10) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑡−3 ) is the probability for bank i to exit the sample in period t due 
to the event j with j= 1, 2 where 1 stands for a failure and 2 for a bailout; 𝛽0is the vector of 
constant terms; 𝛽𝑔 is the vector of g parameters to be estimated; and 𝑥𝑔,𝑖𝑡−3 is the three-period 
lagged vector of the same covariates that we use in our baseline model (Equation 8) and are 
presented in Appendix A. The lag structure (i.e., t-3) is determined by two of the most popular 
selection criteria, namely the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criterion. The left-hand-side expression in Equation (10) is the log odd’s ratio, 
which measures the probability of bank distress relative to the probability of no distress. When 
j=1, the dependent variable takes the value of one for failed banks and the value of zero for non-
failed banks. In a similar vein, when j=2, the dependent variable takes the value of one for bailed 
out banks and the value of zero for non-bailed out banks. The estimated slope coefficients 
measure the impact on the odds of bank failure/bailout of a change in the corresponding 
explanatory variables. Positive coefficients increase the odd of failure/bailout, while negative 
coefficients are associated with a decrease in the odd of failure/bailout. 
     Equation (10) can be estimated by assuming independence of errors across the sample banks 
and across time. Nevertheless, the violation of this assumption is likely to lead to downward 
biased estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients. Hence, we employ a 
heteroskedasticity-robust variance-covariance matrix approach that allows for the possibility of 
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correlated errors within banks. As shown in Table 5, the probabilities of failure and bailout are 
estimated separately based on CAMELS components and the indicators of systemic importance 
(columns 1a and 1b), and also accounting for the additional bank-specific factors and for the 
environmental variables (column 2a and 2b).  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
     Comparing the in-sample estimation results for the two rival models as presented in Tables 4 
and 5, we note that the signs of the fitted coefficients remain largely unchanged. This confirms 
the positive/negative relationships between the explanatory variables and the two hazards under 
scrutiny we document in the estimation of our baseline model. Markedly, the level of statistical 
significance of the majority of the coefficients in the logit regressions is lower compared to the 
significance of the coefficients in our hazard model. Along the same lines, the goodness-of-fit of 
the logit models as given by the value of the pseudo R-squared is substantially lower if compared 
to that of our model.  
 
4.3. Out-of-sample estimation: Dynamic competing risks hazard model vs logit model  
We compare the out-of-sample forecasting power of the two rival models by resorting to the 
decile methodology proposed by Shumway (2001) and Bharath and Shumway (2008). The decile 
forecasting accuracy test captures a model’s ability to predict an event from which actual 
probabilities of that event can be inferred once the coefficients of the examined model are 
estimated. In the context of our analysis, all banks are sorted into deciles each quarter from 
2009q2 to 2009q4 based on the fitted probability values of our forecasting variables (i.e., model 
covariates). Forecasts rely on the complete model specification, that is, on the specification that, 
apart from the CAMELS components and the systemic indicators, also includes the additional 
bank-specific and environmental factors.19 Fitted probabilities (or rankings) are created by 
combining the coefficients from the two rival models estimated using 2003q1-2009q1 data with 
the data available in each subsequent quarter (i.e., 2009q2, 2009q3, and 2009q4). 
     Table 6 reports the percentages of the correctly predicted failures (Panel A) and bailouts 
(Panel B) for both models, which are classified into each of the five highest probability deciles 
and into the least likely 5 deciles in the quarter in which banks actually failed or were bailed out. 
                                                 
19 We also run a decile forecasting accuracy test based on the model specification which excludes the additional 
bank-specific variables and the environmental factors. The results we obtain are similar and are available upon 
request.  
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The top deciles are expected to provide the highest forecasting ability. The correctly predicted 
number of failures and bailouts in each probability decile and the relevant cumulative 
probabilities are also reported in Panels A and B, respectively. 
 [INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
    As shown in the Panel A, our baseline model is able to classify the 63.90% of failed banks 
(107 banks) in the highest probability decile at the beginning of the quarter in which they declare 
bankruptcy, while the logit model is able to classify only the 41.10% of failed institutions (69 
banks) in the top decile. Moreover, our model predicts 19.80% of the failures (33 banks) in the 
second top decile, while logit predicts 14.50% of the failures (24 banks) in this decile. Overall, 
our dynamic competing risks hazard model predicts 83.70% of failures (140 banks) in the top 
two deciles, whereas the relevant prediction ability of the logit model is 55.60% (93 banks). By 
the same token, as displayed in Panel B, our model classifies 80.30% of all bailouts (662 banks) 
in the highest two probability deciles. The relevant percentage for the logit model equals to 
47.50% (391 banks). In sum, the out-of-sample prediction ability of our baseline model clearly 
outperforms that of logit model.  
     Our model can be thought of as a binary logit model that includes each bank-quarter as a 
separate observation. Since our sample banks have 28 quarters of data, approximately 28 times 
more data is available in the estimation of our model than is available to estimate static models 
like it is logit model. Therefore, our model produces more efficient out-of-sample forecasts by 
utilising a much larger range of data. This data results in more precise parameter estimates and 
superior forecasts. Hence, our dynamic competing risks hazard model appears to be a very 
suitable and accurate early warning tool in the prediction of bank failures and bailouts. 
 
5. Robustness analysis  
5.1. In-sample estimation: Robustness checks 
The first phase of TARP was driven by the most systemically important financial institutions as 
described in Section 3.2.2. We account for the impact of the involuntary participation in TARP 
by excluding the nine banks of the first phase from our analysis to alleviate any concerns that the 
decision of the U.S. Treasury to force those banks to receive financial assistance was based on 
different motivations. That is, we exclude those banks that were not expected to be let to fail 
based on political economy considerations, regardless of their economic performance and risk-
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taking characteristics. By doing so, we disentangle the decision of bailing out a bank that comes 
strictly from financial stability considerations associated with TBTF and TCTF institutions from 
a pure economic decision.20 In addition, the biggest bank failure, that of Washington Mutual 
Bank with $307 billion of assets, is treated as an outlier and is excluded from the set of failed 
institutions. Washington Mutual was the sixth largest U.S. commercial bank when it failed in 
September 2008. Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wachovia Bank, Citibank, and Wells 
Fargo Bank were those five institutions with more assets than Washington Mutual Bank. In fact, 
no other commercial or savings banking organisation with more than $100 billion of total assets 
went bankrupt during the crisis. On the other hand, the smallest failed bank held approximately 
$10 million of assets. By excluding the aforementioned ten banks from our analysis, we remove 
the impact of extreme values and outliers on the estimates of our model parameters. This is in 
line with the process followed by Shumway, who winsorises all the covariates at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The results are presented in Table 7a. 
     [INSERT TABLE 7a HERE] 
     We exclude all the banks that were involved in M&As as acquirers from the sample of 
distressed institutions. The main reason is that these acquisitions may have been a source of 
distress.21 In total, we exclude 5 failed and 224 bailed out banks from our initial sample.  
Washington Mutual Bank and the nine banks of the first phase of TARP are part of the excluded 
banks as they all played the role of acquirers at least once during the crisis. Hence, the overall 
number of the failed banks is reduced to 162 and that of the assisted banks shrinks to 600. Table 
7b presents the relevant results. 
     [INSERT TABLE 7b HERE] 
     We enrich our model specification by incorporating three additional environmental variables 
in Equation (8). We resort to Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the degree of 
market concentration calculated as the sum of squared market shares for each bank i in quarter t 
using total deposits as the input variable. We also consider for possible discrepancies in the 
regulatory banking environment following Cole and White (2012) and Berger et al. (2016). The 
primary regulatory authority for nationally chartered banks is the Office of the Comptroller of 
                                                 
20 Alternatively, instead of excluding the phase-one TARP banks, we introduce a dummy variable in our model that 
accounts for these banks. However, the dummy is not found to be statistically significant and, hence, we decide to 
drop it from our analysis. 
21 We thank an anonymous reviewer for providing this suggestion.  
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the Currency (OCC); for the state-chartered banks, it is the Federal Reserve System (FRS); and 
for the state-chartered banks which are not members of FRS it is the FDIC. We include two 
dummy variables in our model, OCC and FRS, keeping the FDIC-regulated banks as the base 
case to account for any differences in the regulatory framework. Moreover, we replace QE which 
was found not to be statistically significant in our main regression analysis with two variables 
that also control for the key government policy actions (others than quantitative easing) that were 
implemented during the crisis period under scrutiny (2007q4-2009q4) to support the operation of 
the U.S. banking and financial sectors. The first one (FEDRATE) captures the easing of 
monetary policy as reflected in a series of significant declines of the target for the federal funds 
rate, which occurred throughout the early crisis period. The Federal Open Market Committee 
began to ease monetary policy in September 2007, reducing its target for the federal funds rate 
by 50 basis points. As indications of economic weakness proliferated, the Committee continued 
to respond, bringing down its target by 325 basis points by the spring of 2008. In October 2008, 
the Committee cut the target further by 100 basis points and, in December 2008, a range of 0 to 
25 basis points was set. Quarterly data on the target for the federal funds rate are obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Database. We also account for the Term 
Auction Facility (TAF), which was one of the key extraordinary credit easing measures of Fed 
towards the stabilisation of turbulent funding markets. The facility was instituted in December 
2007 on a biweekly basis and aimed at providing short-term funds to depository institutions only 
(contrary to the Term Securities Lending Facility and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility that 
constituted the two other credit easing measures and were available only to primary dealers). 
Since the final TAF auction was conducted in March 2010, we introduce a dummy (TAF) that 
takes the value of one from 2007q4 to the end of our data period. All new variables (HHI, OCC, 
FRS, FEDRATE, and TAF) as well as the sources used to construct them are summarised in 
Appendix A. The results of this robustness exercise are presented in Table 7c. 
     [INSERT TABLE 7c HERE] 
     To further enhance the validity of our robustness analysis, we proceed to consider in the 
sample of non-distressed banks all the 282 institutions that failed between 2010q1 and 2012q4 
when the banking crisis in the U.S. is considered to have come to a halt. By doing so, we aim to 
avoid introducing any estimation bias in our forecasting analysis by incorporating in our model 
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only the information that is readily available at the time of estimation. Results are presented in 
Table 7d. 
     [INSERT TABLE 7d HERE] 
     As shown in columns 1a and 1b of Tables 7a to 7d, our estimation results remain robust to the 
tests we carry out. We corroborate that capital (CAP1) is beneficial for banks’ health, as it 
significantly reduces both the probability of failure and that of bailout. In other words, increased 
leverage is harmful for banks as it undermines their soundness making them vulnerable to 
economic and financial shocks. We also confirm that when credit quality (ASSETQLT1) 
worsens, the odds of failure becomes higher; however, the bailout probability is not significantly 
affected by the volume of bad loans. Efficient bank management (MNGEXP1) exerts a 
decreasing effect on the failure probability, but has no statistically significant impact on the 
bailout probability. To continue, more profitable banks (EARN1) as well as those that hold a 
larger portion of liquid assets (LQDT1) are found to have lower failure and bailout probabilities. 
We also confirm that the level of sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK1) increases both the 
hazard of failure and that of bailout.  
     Our results also verify the impact of the systemic importance indicators on the examined 
probabilities, providing further evidence for the validity of the TBTF and the TCTF phenomena. 
In specific, the estimated coefficients on size (SIZE) indicate that the larger a bank is the less 
likely is to fail and the more likely is to be bailed out. Organisational complexity (ORGCOMPL) 
is negatively linked to the probability of failure and positively related to the odds of bailout, 
whereas the business model complexity as reflected in the involvement of banks with non-
traditional activities (SECASSET1 and DERIV1) significantly decreases the odds of an institution 
to declare bankruptcy, increasing, at the same time, the odds to receive financial aid. 
     In line with the results of our main analysis, we also document that better-connected banks 
are significantly more likely to receive TARP money. On the other hand, a bank’s connections 
with politicians, political parties, or regulators exert a significantly negative impact on failure as 
they lower the relevant probability. This is to say, regulators are more likely to provide financial 
support to a distressed banking firm which is well-connected and less likely to let it go bankrupt. 
These results hold for all four relevant variables (POLCON, CAMP, FEDCON and COMMIT). 
Importantly, our estimation results remain robust in respect to all the additional bank-specific 
variables (MA, MSA, DENOVO, PUBLIC, and HC) we employ in our analysis. Similarly, the 
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coefficients and the levels of statistical significance for the remaining environmental variables 
(TMTF, INF, and GDP) are either the same or very similar with those obtained in our baseline 
estimation. 
     If we focus on Table 7c (columns 1a and 1b), we notice that market concentration (HHI) is 
negatively (positively) associated with the risk of failure (bailout). The relevant coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, implying that distressed banks are significantly 
less likely to fail and more likely to receive assistance when the market structure of the banking 
industry is more concentrated. In line with the results of Cole and White (2012) and Berger et al. 
(2016), OCC is found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on failure probability, 
which means that nationally chartered banks are more likely to fail. On the other hand, the 
impact of OCC on the bailout hazard is not significant. Further, we report no significant 
influence on the failure and bailout probabilities that could be explained by FRS as a bank’s 
primary regulatory authority. To continue, a reduction in the target for the federal funds rate 
(FEDRATE) significantly reduces the failure probability at the 5% level, but has no significant 
impact on the odds of bailout. As regards TAF, it exerts a positive and statistically significant 
effect at the 10% level on the probability of failure, having no effect on the bailout probability. 
     We can now turn to examine the in-sample regression results of the logit model based on the 
relevant robustness tests. As shown in columns 2a and 2b of Tables 7a to 7d, the signs of the 
estimated coefficients remain the same, endorsing the positive/negative links between the 
regressors and the two probabilities under examination. Noticeably, the statistical significance of 
most of the coefficients in the logit regressions is lower compared to that of the fitted 
coefficients of our robustness hazard model. As regards the goodness-of-fit of the logit models 
which is reflected in the relevant values of the pseudo R-squared, this is considerably lower 
compared to that of our model. 
 
5.2. In-sample estimation: Additional robustness checks 
In our baseline model specification (Equation 8), we implicitly assume that the heterogeneity 
among the sample banks is captured by the set of covariates used to forecast bank failure and 
bank bailout. In case this assumption does not hold true, then our model variables may be 
characterised by unobserved heterogeneity. This implies that the conditional independence 
assumption of the Shumway model, which is one of the three assumptions to be met for a hazard 
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model to be consistent, will be violated. This assumption is, in fact, analogous to the common 
econometric assumption that the model is sufficiently well specified to guarantee that the error 
terms of different observations are independent of each other. Hence, although we employ a 
broad spectrum of bank-specific variables in our main analysis that can capture a large portion of 
heterogeneity among our sample banks, we should consider the possibility that some piece of 
bank-specific information may have been omitted. To address possible unobserved 
heterogeneity, we introduce a heterogeneity term 𝜀𝑖 in Equation (8):  
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥(𝑡)) = ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) exp[𝛽𝑗
′𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖],                                           (11) 
 
where 𝜀𝑖 stands for the unobserved heterogeneity among banks.
22 
     As an additional robustness test, we apply a set of alternative CAMELS components on 
Equation (8).23 The main reason is that the components of CAMELS are kept confidential from 
regulators and, hence, it is crucial to test the sensitivity of our baseline regression results to a set 
of alternative CAMELS variables. Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory 
capital to total risk-weighted assets (CAP2); asset quality is captured by the restructured and 
outstanding balances of loans and lease financing receivables that the bank has placed in 
nonaccrual status divided by total loans and leases (ASSETQLT2); management expertise is 
proxied by the total operating income calculated by the sum of interest income and non-interest 
income as a fraction of total earning assets (MNGEXP2), which is a typical measure of operating 
efficiency in the banking literature (see, e.g., Lane et al., 1986); the return on equity given by the 
ratio of total net income to total equity capital is utilised to measure bank earnings (EARN2); the 
ratio of federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase to total assets 
(LQDT2) is employed to measure the degree of liquidity; and the sensitivity to market risk 
(SENSRISK2) is proxied by the market interest rate risk defined as the quarterly standard 
deviation of the day-to-day 3-month U.S. T-bill rate divided by total earning assets. 
     Importantly, our results remain robust to the alternative model specification which takes 
possible bank heterogeneity into consideration. Results are also robust to the use of the 
                                                 
22 Allowing for heterogeneity may lead to less efficient estimators when datasets are small. Our dataset, however, is 
large and, hence, any minor loss of efficiency is not considered to be significant. 
23 The alternative set of CAMELS is also applied on Equation (11). The obtained results remain largely the same 
and are available upon request. 
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alternative set of CAMELS components. For the sake of brevity, we do not present the results of 
these robustness checks, which, however, remain available on request. 
 
5.3 Out-of-sample estimation: A robustness test 
We now test the robustness of the out-of-sample forecasting ability of the two rival models by 
applying the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC curve, henceforth). The ROC curve 
plots the true positive rate versus the false positive rate for all the sample banks, calculating the 
trade-off between the Type 1 and Type 2 errors. Type 1 error corresponds to misclassifying a 
failed (bailed out) bank as a non-failed (non-bailed out) bank. A Type 2 error corresponds to 
misclassifying a non-distressed bank as a distressed bank. In sum, the ROC curve shows how 
well each of the two rival models clusters the sample banks into the actual groups of non-
distressed, failed, and bailed out banks.  
     The out-of-sample predictions rely on the coefficients we obtain by estimating the dynamic 
competing risks hazard model (Equation 11) and the logit model (Equation 10) over the 2003q1-
2009q1 period. In the estimation of the logit model, we account for quarterly fixed effects since 
fixed effects are considered to be the analogue of the unobserved heterogeneity term that we 
introduced in Equation (11). The estimated coefficients are then applied to data for the 
subsequent three quarters (i.e., 2009q2 to 2009q4) to test the forecasting accuracy of the two 
models.24 
[INSERT FIGURE 1A HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 1B HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2A HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2B HERE] 
     A ROC curve with a perfect forecasting ability would start at the top left corner of at a Type 1 
error rate (as shown on the vertical axes in Figures 1a through 2b) of 100% and a Type 2 error 
rate (as shown on the horizontal axes in Figures 1a through 2b) of 0%, track down the vertical 
axis to a Type 1 error rate of 0% and a Type 2 error rate of 0%, and then track right across the 
horizontal axis to a Type 1 error rate of 0% and a Type 2 error rate of 100%. Our model 
demonstrates a higher degree of convexity to the origin as shown in Figures 1a and 2a compared 
to that of the logit model (Figures 1b and 2b), thus indicating a stronger forecasting power. More 
                                                 
24 Like in Section 4.3, the out-of-sample estimations rely on the complete model specification. 
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specifically, by examining Figures 1a and 1b we can highlight that for a Type 2 error rate of 1% 
where we misclassify 66 out of 6,611 non-problem banks, the Type 1 error rate is 13.7% (23 out 
of 167 failures) for our model and 21.0% (35 out of 167 failures) for the logit model. Similarly, 
for a Type 2 error rate of 5% where we misclassify 331 out of 6,611 banks, the Type 1 error rate 
is only 2.7% (5 out of 167 failures) for our model and 6.4% (11 out of 167 failures) for logit. 
Turning to examine Figures 2a and 2b which display the out-of-sample forecasting power of the 
two rival models for the bailout probability, we note that for a Type 2 error rate of 1%, the Type 
1 error rate is 15.4% (127 out of 824 bailouts) for our model and 22.7% (187 out of 824 bailouts) 
for the logit model. In a similar vein, for a Type 2 error rate of 5%, the Type 1 error rate is 4.1% 
(34 out of 824 bailouts) for our model and 8.9% (73 out of 824 bailouts) for logit. To sum up, the 
outcome of the out-of-sample robustness analysis based on the ROC curve is consistent with the 
outcome received from the decile forecasting accuracy test.25 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
Numerous banking institutions around the globe faced severe liquidity problems and capital 
shortages after the eruption of the global financial crisis in mid-to-late 2007. National 
governments in close cooperation with regulatory authorities spent a vast amount of money to 
keep many of these institutions afloat with the utmost purpose to protect the financial system 
from a sort of chain domino defaults and to restore the confidence in it. On the other hand, 
several distressed banks went bankrupt, incurring a large cost to governments, bank customers, 
bond holders, market participants, and tax payers. 
     In this paper, we contribute to the better understanding of the key factors related to the 
operation of the banking system that led to the recent crisis through the development of an early 
warning system of bank distress. We resort to the dynamic approach of Shumway to develop a 
competing risks hazard model, which considers not only the concept of failure but also that of 
bailout. The underlying patterns of distress are analysed based upon a broad spectrum of bank-
specific and environmental determinants. 
                                                 
25 As an additional out-of-sample test of the forecasting accuracy of the two models, we resort to the Root Mean 
Square Error (RMSE) test that provides us with an indication of the accuracy of a forecast by stating that projections 
with a lower value are preferable. The results of the RMSE test further corroborate the superior predicting ability of 
our model. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
45 
 
     We provide strong evidence that banking organisations with inadequate capital, illiquid and 
risky assets, poor management, low levels of earnings and high sensitivity to market conditions 
have a higher bankruptcy probability. However, not all the aforementioned factors play an 
important role in the probability of a bank to receive assistance in the case of a financial debacle. 
In specific, management quality, as reflected in the ability of managers to create profits for their 
banks, does not significantly affect the likelihood of a bank to receive financial aid. This is rather 
counterintuitive if we consider that regulators principally aim at restoring the financial health of 
a bailed out bank, which, however, is likely to deteriorate in case of bad managerial decisions. 
Further, the quality of bank assets is found not to be relevant to the bailout likelihood. This is 
related to the TMTF problem, which is also evidenced in our empirical analysis. In specific, 
authorities are more prone to bail out a distressed bank if a crisis is viewed as being of systemic 
importance regardless of the quality of its portfolio of assets. 
     Our findings also reveal that large and complex financial institutions are less likely to face a 
licence withdrawal and more likely to be bailed out. Hence, we provide strong evidence on the 
occurrence of the TBTF and the TCTF phenomena in banking. Moreover, authorities are found 
to be more prone to provide support to a distressed institution which is well-connected with 
politicians and political parties and less prone to let it go bankrupt. Crucially, the effects of an 
additional set of key bank-specific variables together with a set of environmental variables that 
we employ in our analysis confirm that, on the whole, the determinants of bank failures and 
those of bailouts differ from each other to a considerable degree.  
     Importantly, the forecasting accuracy of the hazard model we develop and apply in our 
analysis is stronger compared to that of the logit model, which is commonly used in the early 
warning literature to predict failures. The dynamic nature of our model provides us with the 
advantage of examining how the probability of a bank becoming distressed may vary over time. 
This cannot be achieved if a static model like the logit model is used instead. In the context of 
our research, bank health is allowed to change through time and distress is measured as a 
function of a broad set of accounting and financial data, bank-specific characteristics, 
macroeconomic factors, as well as variables reflecting the bank regulatory environment. That is, 
all the available information is utilised in our model to produce failure and bailout probability 
estimates for each bank at each sample quarter.  
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     In sum, our findings offer valuable insights on how to better structure the components of the 
banking industry with the purpose to reduce bank actions that exert a negative impact on bank 
soundness and can harm the stability of the financial system. The competing risks hazard model 
à la Shumway we propose is considered to be a key tool which can be utilised to distinguish 
healthy from distressed institutions and can work as an effective mechanism for preventing 
future welfare losses due to possible failures and bailouts in case of a financial meltdown. 
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Appendix A. Variables and data sources 
This Appendix presents all the variables we use in the main econometric analysis as well as in the robustness analysis. The abbreviation of each variable and the sources 
we utilise to collect the data are also reported. 
Variable  Abbreviation Definition Data source 
CAMELS components    
Capital adequacy 
CAP1 The ratio of book equity capital to total assets 
Call Reports 
& 
Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) Central 
Data Repository's Public 
Data Distribution 
CAP2 The ratio of regulatory (Tier 1) capital to total risk-weighted assets 
Asset quality 
ASSETQLT1 The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and leases  
ASSETQLT2 
The ratio of restructured and outstanding balances of loans and lease financing 
receivables that the bank has placed in nonaccrual status to total loans and leases 
Management expertise 
MNGEXP1 Managerial efficiency calculated using the input-oriented DEA model  
MNGEXP2 
The ratio of total operating income calculated as the sum of interest income and 
non-interest income to total earning assets 
Earnings strength 
EARN1 
The ratio of total net income given by the difference between total interest plus 
non-interest income and total interest plus non-interest expense to total assets 
EARN2 
The ratio of total net income given by the difference between total interest plus 
non-interest income and total interest plus non-interest expense to equity capital 
Liquidity 
LQDT1 The ratio of cash and balances due from depository institutions to total deposits 
LQDT2 
The ratio of federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to 
repurchase to total assets 
Sensitivity to market risk 
SENSRISK1 
The change in the slope of the yield curve (given by the change in the quarterly 
difference between the 10-year U.S. T-bill rate and the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate) 
divided by total earning assets 
Call Reports 
& 
Federal Reserve Board  
& 
U.S. Department of the 
Treasury 
SENSRISK2 
Market interest rate risk (defined as the quarterly standard deviation of the day-
to-day 3-month U.S. T-bill rate) divided by total earning assets 
Systemic importance    
Bank size SIZE The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
Call Reports 
& 
Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) Central 
Data Repository's Public 
Data Distribution 
Organisational complexity ORGCOMPL 
The log of the product of the number of branches that each sample bank has and 
the number of U.S. states in which the bank has branches 
Business complexity 
SECASSET 
The ratio of the outstanding principal balance of loans, leases, and all relevant 
assets securitised and sold to other financial institutions with recourse or other 
credit enhancements to total assets 
DERIV 
The ratio of the total amount of the outstanding derivative contracts to total 
equity capital 
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Additional bank-specific variables 
   
Political connections POLCON 
A dummy that equals one if a bank has employed, or is currently employing an 
individual who is also employed or has been employed in the federal 
government or appointed to a government advisory board, a congressional or 
presidential cabinet entity, or an independent commission 
Centre for Responsive 
Politics (CRP)’s Revolving 
Door 
Federal connections FEDCON 
A dummy that is equal to unity if an executive at a sample bank was on the 
board of directors of one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks or one of their 
branches either in 2008 or 2009 
Federal Reserve 
& 
BoardEx 
Political commitments COMMIT 
A dummy that equals one if a sample bank is headquartered in a district of a 
House member who served on the key finance committees involved in drafting 
and amending TARP either in 2008 or 2009 
House of Representative, 
U.S. Census Bureau 
& 
U.S. Library of Congress 
Campaign contributions CAMP 
A dummy that takes the value of one if a sample bank has made PAC 
contributions in the election cycle for the 2008 congressional election to the 
members of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and the Subcommittee 
on Capital Markets 
Federal Election 
Commission 
Political Action 
Committees (PACs) 
M&A transactions MA 
A dummy which is equal to unity if a bank is involved in a M&A transaction as 
an acquirer 
M&As database/Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Bank location MSA 
A dummy indicating whether a bank is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area 
or not 
Call Reports &  
U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget 
Newly-chartered bank DENOVO A dummy indicating a bank which is less than five years old Call Reports 
Listed bank PUBLIC 
A dummy which is equal to unity if a bank is listed on the stock exchange 
market 
Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
HC affiliation HC A dummy indicating whether a bank is a Holding Company subsidiary Call Reports 
 
Environmental variables 
   Quantitative Easing QE A dummy showing the first round of quantitative easing programme in U.S. Federal Reserve 
Target for the Federal Funds rate FEDRATE The quarterly change in the target for the Federal Funds rate 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Economic Database 
Term Auction Facility TAF A dummy capturing the period that the Term Auction Facility was in place Federal Reserve 
Too-Many-To-Fail TMTF 
The average capital ratio (total equity capital to total assets) of other banks in the 
economy weighted by bank total assets 
Call Reports 
Inflation rate INF The quarterly change in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Economic growth GDP GDP output gap Bureau of Economic 
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Analysis, U.S. Department 
of Commerce 
Market concentration HHI 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated as the sum of squared market shares for 
each sample bank in each quarter using total deposits as the input variable 
Call Reports 
Primary regulator for national 
banks 
OCC 
A dummy indicating whether a bank is a national bank and, as such, is regulated 
by the OCC 
Primary regulator for state-
chartered banks 
FRS 
A dummy indicating whether a sample bank is a state-chartered bank and, as 
such, is regulated by the FRS 
Distress indicator    
Z-score 
 
Z 
 
The sum of EARN1 and CAP1 divided by the standard deviation of EARN1  
 
Call Reports 
 
Managerial efficiency    
Total loans y1 The sum of commercial, construction, industrial, individual and real estate loans 
Call Reports 
& 
Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) Central 
Data Repository's Public 
Data Distribution 
Total deposits y2 
The sum of total transaction deposit accounts, non-transaction savings deposits, 
and total time deposits 
Other earning assets y3 
The sum of income-earned assets other than loans and the net deferred income 
taxes 
Total non-interest income y4 
The sum of income from fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit 
accounts, trading fees and income from foreign exchange transactions and from 
assets held in trading accounts, and other non-interest income 
Price of borrowed funds w1 The ratio of total interest expense to total deposits and other borrowed money 
Price of labour w2 The ratio of total salaries and benefits to the number of full-time employees 
Price of physical capital w3 
The ratio of expenses for premises and fixed assets to the dollar amount of 
premises and fixed assets 
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Appendix B. Estimation of Managerial Efficiency 
To estimate managerial efficiency (MNGEXP1), we employ the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) model. DEA model can be computed either as input- or output-oriented. The input-
oriented DEA model shows by how much input quantities can be reduced without varying the 
output quantities produced. Similarly, the output-oriented DEA model assesses by how much 
output quantities can be proportionally increased without changing the input quantities used. 
Both output- and input-oriented models identify the same set of efficient/inefficient bank 
management. Nevertheless, even though the two approaches provide the same results under 
constant returns to scale, they give different values under variable returns to scale.26  
     We assume that for the n sample banks, there exist Q inputs producing M outputs. Hence, 
each bank i uses a nonnegative vector of inputs denoted by 𝑤𝑖 = (𝑤1
𝑖 ,  𝑤2
𝑖 , … , 𝑤𝑞
𝑖 )𝑅+
𝑄 to 
produce a nonnegative vector of outputs, denoted by 𝑦𝑖 = (𝑦1
𝑖 ,  𝑦2
𝑖 , … , 𝑦𝑚
𝑖 )𝑅+
𝑀, where: i = 1, 
2,…, n; q = 1, 2,…, Q; and m = 1, 2,…, M. The production technology, 𝐹 =
 {(𝑦, 𝑤): 𝑤 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦}, describes the set of feasible input-output vectors. The input sets of 
production technology 𝐿(𝑦) = {𝑤: (𝑦, 𝑤) ∊ 𝐹 } describe the sets of input vectors which are 
feasible for each output vector. 
To measure the variable returns to scale managerial cost efficiency (MNGEXP1), we resort to 
the following input-oriented DEA model, where inputs are minimised and outputs are held at 
constant levels. Below, we sketch out the optimisation (minimisation) problem of bank1’s (i=1) 
cost inefficiency. Note that each bank i faces the same optimisation problem. 
 
𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11
∗ = min(−𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11),   𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑞 ≤ (𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11)(𝑤1𝑞)
𝑁
𝑖=1       (B1)                                       
           ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑚 ≥ 𝑦1𝑚
𝑁
𝑖=1         (B2)        
               ∑ 𝜆𝑖 = 1
𝑁
𝑖=1           (B3) 
            𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0           (B4) 
 
     In Equations (B1- B4), w1q and y1m are the qth input and mth output for bank1, 
respectively; the convexity constraint given by Equation (B3) accounts for the variable returns to 
scale, where 𝜆𝑖 stands for the activity vector and denotes the intensity levels at which the total 
                                                 
26 For a detailed discussion on the differences between input- and output-oriented DEA models, the interested reader 
can refer to Coelli et al. (2005). 
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observations are conducted. This approach, through the convexity constraint, forms a convex 
hull of intersecting planes, since the frontier production plane is defined by combining a set of 
actual production planes. If 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11
∗  is equal to unity, then the optimal efficiency score is 
achieved for bank1. This shows that the levels of inputs used cannot be proportionally improved 
given the output levels, indicating that bank1 lies upon the cost efficiency frontier. If, on the 
other hand, 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11is less than unity the management of bank1 is considered to be 
inefficient. The more 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃11 deviates from the unity, the less efficient the management of 
bank1 becomes. 
     An important concern in the estimation of MNGEXP1 is the definition of inputs and outputs. 
This essentially depends on the specific role that deposits play in the overall business model of 
banks. The relevant literature addresses this issue by traditionally referring to two approaches: 
the intermediation (or asset) approach, and the production (or value-added) approach.27 Under 
the former approach, financial firms are viewed as intermediaries which transform deposits and 
purchased funds into loans and other earning assets. That is, liabilities and physical factors are 
treated as inputs, while assets are treated as outputs. The production approach, on the other hand, 
regards financial institutions as producers of services for account holders, measuring output with 
the number of transactions or documents processed over a given period of time. Therefore, 
deposits are encompassed in the output and not in the input vector, which exclusively consists of 
physical entities. 
     Berger and Humphrey (1991) proposed a third approach, the modified production approach, 
which, contrary to the aforementioned traditional approaches, captures the dual role of bank 
deposits. This third approach is regarded as a combination of the intermediation and production 
approaches, as it enables the consideration of both the input and output characteristics of deposits 
in the cost function. More specifically, the price of deposits is considered to be an input, whereas 
the volume of deposits is accounted as an output. Under this specification, banks are assumed to 
provide intermediation and loan services as well as payment, liquidity, and safekeeping services 
at the same time. Hence, it can be argued that the latter approach describes the key bank activity 
of deposit-taking in a more complete manner thereby providing a closer representation of reality. 
                                                 
27 See Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a detailed analysis of the advantages and the disadvantages of each of the 
two approaches.  
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     We adopt the modified production approach to define inputs and outputs in the estimation of 
MNGEXP1. We specify four variable outputs, namely total loans (y1), calculated as the sum of 
commercial, construction, industrial, individual and real estate loans; total deposits (y2), which is 
the sum of total transaction deposit accounts, non-transaction savings deposits, and total time 
deposits; other earning assets (y3), expressed as the sum of income-earned assets other than loans 
and the net deferred income taxes; and the total non-interest income (y4) which is the sum of 
income from fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit accounts, trading fees and income 
from foreign exchange transactions and from assets held in trading accounts plus other non-
interest income. 
     Regarding the inputs we employ in the estimation of MNGEXP1, we consider borrowed 
funds, labour, and physical capital. The price of borrowed funds (w1) is defined as the ratio of 
total interest expense scaled by total deposits and other borrowed money; the price of labour (w2) 
is calculated by dividing total salaries and benefits by the number of employees; and the price of 
physical capital (w3), which is equal to the expenses for premises and fixed assets divided by the 
dollar amount of premises and fixed assets.  
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Figure 1a. This figure depicts the ROC curve which describes the trade-off between 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors for the fitted probability of failure based on the out-of-sample 
estimation of the dynamic competing risks hazard model (Equation 15) over the 
2003q1-2009q1 period. The estimated coefficients are applied to data for the subsequent 
three quarters (2009q2-2009q4). Type 1 error (vertical axis) corresponds to 
misclassifying a failed bank as a non-failed bank; Type 2 error (horizontal axis) 
corresponds to misclassifying a non-distressed bank as a distressed bank.  
 
 
Figure 1b. This figure depicts the ROC curve which describes the trade-off between 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors for the fitted probability of failure based on the out-of-sample 
estimation of the logit model (Equation 10) that accounts for quarterly fixed effects over 
the 2003q1-2009q1 period. The estimated coefficients are applied to data for the 
subsequent three quarters (2009q2 - 2009q4). Type 1 error (vertical axis) corresponds to 
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misclassifying a failed bank as a non-failed bank; Type 2 error (horizontal axis) 
corresponds to misclassifying a non-distressed bank as a distressed bank. 
 
Figure 2a. This figure depicts the ROC curve which describes the trade-off between 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors for the fitted probability of bailout based on the out-of-sample 
estimation of the dynamic competing risks hazard model (Equation 15) over the 
2003q1-2009q1 period. The estimated coefficients are applied to data for the subsequent 
three quarters (2009q2-2009q4). Type 1 error (vertical axis) corresponds to 
misclassifying a bailed out bank as a non-bailed out bank; Type 2 error (horizontal axis) 
corresponds to misclassifying a non-distressed bank as a distressed bank. 
 
 
Figure 2b. This figure depicts the ROC curve which describes the trade-off between 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors for the fitted probability of bailout based on the out-of-sample 
estimation of the logit model (Equation 10) that accounts for quarterly fixed effects over 
the 2003q1-2009q1 period. The estimated coefficients are then applied to data for the 
subsequent three quarters (2009q2-2009q4). Type 1 error (vertical axis) corresponds to 
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misclassifying a bailed out bank as a non-bailed out bank; Type 2 error (horizontal axis) 
corresponds to misclassifying a non-distressed bank as a distressed bank. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics and univariate analysis: CAMELS and systemic importance indicators 
This table presents the summary statistics, reporting the means and the standard deviations of the six components of 
CAMELS ratings, i.e., capital strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), quality of management (MNGEXP1), 
earnings strength (EARN1), degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK1), as well as the 
means and the standard deviations of the systemic importance indicators, i.e., bank size (SIZE), organisational 
complexity (ORGCOMPL), securitisation activity (SECASSET), exposure to derivative products (DERIV) for the 
non-distressed, failed, and bailed out banks. The results of a univariate analysis for the mean differences of the 
aforementioned variables amongst the three banking groups are also presented; the values of a t-test that captures the 
statistical differences in the means are reported in parentheses. All observations are on bank level and constitute 
average bank-quarter observations over the pre-crisis period (2003q1-2007q3). The description of variables and the 
relevant data sources are provided in Appendix A. ***, and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, and 5% 
level, respectively. 
 Non-
distressed 
(obs=6,611) 
Failed 
 
(obs=167) 
Bailed out 
 
(obs=824) 
Non-distressed 
        vs 
     Failed 
Non-distressed 
         vs  
   Bailed out 
    Failed 
       vs  
  Bailed out 
Variables 
Mean 
(Stdev) 
Mean 
(Stdev) 
Mean 
(Stdev) 
Mean diff. 
(t-statistics) 
Mean diff. 
(t-statistics) 
Mean diff. 
(t-statistics) 
CAP1 (%) 12.63 
(7.09) 
10.17 
(5.19) 
9.23 
(6.79) 
     2.46*** 
    (6.02) 
      3.40*** 
     (7.12) 
      0.94*** 
     (6.97) 
ASSETQLT1 (%) 
0.58 
(9.38) 
1.40 
(14.62) 
1.92 
(16.73) 
    -0.82*** 
   (-4.23) 
     -1.34*** 
    (-6.14) 
     -0.52*** 
    (-7.86) 
MNGEXP1 
0.79 
(2.90) 
0.77 
(2.31) 
0.64 
(9.41) 
      0.02 
    (1.28) 
      0.15** 
     (1.99) 
       0.13** 
      (2.05) 
EARN1 (%) 
0.81 
(3.62) 
0.27 
(2.59) 
0.14 
(7.87) 
     0.54*** 
    (3.85) 
     0.67*** 
    (4.89) 
       0.13*** 
      (3.42) 
LQDT1 (%) 
4.74 
(5.38) 
3.01 
(5.97) 
2.01 
(10.43) 
     1.73*** 
    (3.40) 
     2.73*** 
    (4.01) 
       1.00*** 
      (4.89) 
SENSRISK1 (%) 
10.77 
(7.49) 
10.68 
(6.82) 
17.18 
(10.63) 
      0.09 
    (1.42) 
    -6.41** 
   (-2.00) 
      -6.50** 
     (-1.96) 
SIZE (in $bn) 
0.86 
(230.84) 
0.89 
(185.03) 
9.98 
(527.18) 
     -0.03 
    (-1.29) 
    -9.12*** 
   (-6.52) 
      -9.09*** 
     (-8.96) 
ORGCOMPL 
1.19 
(138.01) 
1.40 
(107.14) 
1.64 
(91.59) 
    -0.21 
   (-2.06)** 
    -0.45 
   (-3.68)*** 
      -0.24 
     (-1.65)* 
SECASSET (%) 
10.23 
(39.26) 
9.89 
(27.42) 
17.32 
(12.82) 
     0.34  
    (1.27) 
    -7.09*** 
   (-6.29) 
      -7.43*** 
     (-8.33) 
DERIV (%) 
8.14 
(43.77) 
7.93 
(30.58) 
21.63 
(11.82) 
     0.21 
    (1.38) 
   -13.49*** 
   (-4.11) 
     -13.70*** 
      (-6.55) 
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Table 2. Summary statistics: Additional bank-specific variables 
This table presents the summary statistics, reporting the means, medians, and standard deviations for the 
additional bank-specific variables we employ in our analysis. These variables are: a dummy capturing the 
political connections of banks (POLCON); a dummy for the connections of banks with the regulatory 
authorities (FEDCON); a dummy that shows if a sample bank is headquartered in a district of a House 
member who served on the key finance committees (COMMIT); a dummy for banks which made PAC 
contributions in the 2008 elections (CAMP); a dummy for the acquirer banks in M&A transactions (MA); a 
dummy showing whether a bank is located in a MSA or in a rural county (MSA); a dummy for newly-
chartered banks (DENOVO); a dummy for banks which are listed on the stock exchange (PUBLIC); and a 
dummy indicating whether a bank is a subsidiary of a HC (HC). All observations are on bank level, 
constitute bank-quarter observations, and cover the entire data period that extends from 2003q1 to 2009q4. 
The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Appendix A. *** denotes that 
the mean of failed banks is significantly different from that of bailed out banks at the 1% level; ** denotes 
that the mean of failed banks is significantly different from that of bailed out banks at the 5% level. 
 
Non-distressed banks  
(obs=6,611) 
Failed banks  
(obs=167) 
Bailed out banks 
(obs=824) 
Variable Mean Median Stdev   Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
POLCON 0.0361 0.0000 11.28 0.0170*** 0.0000  7.94 0.0738 0.0000 12.54 
FEDCON 0.0389 0.0000 49.31 0.0181*** 0.0000 13.92 0.0631 0.0000 10.95 
COMMIT 0.0410 0.0000 32.84 0.0294** 00000 20.17 0.0936 0.0000   7.68 
CAMP 0.0205 0.0168 37.94 0.0135*** 0.0089 3.79 0.0542 0.0493   3.15 
MA 0.0840 0.0000  9.33 0.0280*** 0.0000  3.41 0.2724 1.0000   3.02 
MSA 0.5368 1.0000 10.75 0.4193** 0.0000  8.94 0.7141 1.0000 10.69 
DENOVO 0.0311 0.0000 18.73 0.0807*** 0.0000 23.02 0.0320 0.0000 31.84 
PUBLIC 0.0395 0.0000 26.94 0.0278*** 0.0000 11.81 0.0756 0.0000 12.70 
HC 0.2239 0.0000 23.06 0.1062** 0.0000  5.44 0.6268 1.0000   5.62 
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Table 3. Level of individual bank distress  
This table reports the level of individual bank distress proxied by Z-score (Z). Z is measured for each sample 
bank and for each quarter in the crisis period (i.e., 2007q4 to 2009q4). In the case of failed and bailed out 
banks, Z is measured for each quarter prior to the failure or bailout quarter, respectively. The summary 
(average) Z is then computed for each bank over the examined period and each Z is assigned to a decile. All 
banks are sorted in deciles based on their summary Z. The number of banks as well as the relevant percentage 
for each of the three banking groups by decile of distress is calculated and reported. Banks in the top 10 
percent (i.e., in Decile 1) achieve the highest Z-scores that reflect the lowest levels of distress; banks in the 
lowest 10 percent (i.e., in Decile 10) have the lowest Z-scores which reflect the highest distress levels. 
 Failed banks Bailed out banks Non-distressed banks 
Decile Number of 
banks 
 Percentage 
(%) 
Number of 
banks 
Percentage 
(%) 
Number of 
banks 
Percentage 
(%) 
1 0 0.00 44 5.34 3,459 52.32 
2 1 0.60 3 0.37 1,132 17.12 
3 0 0.00 8 0.97 891 13.48 
4 4 2.39 9 1.09 308 4.66 
5 3 1.80 10 1.21 152 2.30 
6 5 2.99 1 0.12 218 3.30 
7 3 1.80 51 6.19 102 1.54 
8 8 4.79 73 8.86 117 1.77 
9 29 17.37 207 25.12 95 1.44 
10 114 68.26 418 50.73 137 2.07 
TOTAL 167 100.00 824 100.00 6,611 100.00 
 
Table 4. In-sample estimation: Dynamic competing risks hazard model 
This table reports the results from the in-sample estimation of the dynamic competing risks hazard model 
with two types of bank distress, i.e., failure and bailout, as presented in Equation (8). The dependent variable 
equals to one if a bank fails (columns 1a and 2a), or if it is bailed out (columns 1b and 2b) and zero 
otherwise. The non-distressed banks constitute the holdout group in the estimation. Two different 
specifications of Equation (8) are estimated: the first specification, as presented in columns 1a and 1b, 
considers the CAMELS components (capital strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), management 
expertise (MNGEXP1), earnings strength (EARN1), degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity to market 
risk (SENSRISK1)), together with the indicators of systemic importance (bank size (SIZE), organisational 
complexity (ORGCOMPL), securitisation activity (SECASSET), and exposure to derivative products 
(DERIV)); the second specification presented in columns 2a and 2b also accounts for the additional bank-
specific factors (political connections (POLCON), connections with regulators (FEDCON), connections with 
House members (COMMIT), contributions to federal political campaigns (CAMP), acquirer banks in M&A 
transactions (MA), location in MSA or in a rural county (MSA), newly-chartered banks (DENOVO), listed 
banks (PUBLIC), holding company subsidiaries (HC)), as well as for the environmental variables 
(quantitative easing (QE), Too-Many-To-Fail effect (TMTF), price level (INF), and economic growth 
(GDP)).The coefficients for the two types of distress are jointly estimated under both model specifications. 
All variables and their data sources are described in Appendix A. Observations are on bank level, constitute 
bank-quarter observations, and cover the entire data period, which extends from 2003q1 to 2009q4. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient values. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type of distress 
      Failure (1a)                Bailout (1b) Failure (2a) Bailout (2b) 
Variables     
CAP1 
  -1.77*** 
      (-3.01) 
                 -1.58*** 
                (-2.99) 
 -1.68*** 
      (-3.82) 
        -1.50*** 
       (-4.12) 
ASSETQLT1 
  1.39*** 
       (2.78) 
                  0.92 
                 (1.37) 
  1.27*** 
       (3.56) 
          0.85 
         (1.55) 
AC
CE
P
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 66 
MNGEXP1 
       -1.96** 
      (-2.04) 
                  1.19 
                 (1.28) 
       -1.90** 
      (-2.53) 
          1.05 
         (1.49) 
EARN1 
       -1.43*** 
      (-3.12) 
                 -2.11** 
                (-2.08) 
       -1.27*** 
      (-4.05) 
         -2.01** 
        (-2.45) 
LQDT1 
       -1.59** 
      (-1.96) 
                 -1.37** 
                (-1.95) 
       -1.41*** 
      (-2.76) 
         -1.20** 
        (-2.41) 
SENSRISK1 
0.95** 
       (2.20) 
                  1.10** 
                 (2.23) 
0.85** 
       (2.42) 
          1.04*** 
         (2.69) 
SIZE 
       -1.33*** 
      (-3.44) 
                  1.39*** 
                 (2.97) 
       -1.49*** 
      (-4.79) 
          1.58*** 
         (4.35) 
ORGCOMPL 
       -0.71* 
      (-1.69) 
                  1.20* 
                 (1.75) 
       -0.62* 
      (-1.87) 
          1.07** 
         (2.19) 
SECASSET 
       -2.14*** 
      (-2.78) 
                  5.62** 
                 (2.11) 
       -2.19*** 
      (-4.05) 
          6.13*** 
         (3.48) 
DERIV 
       -3.30** 
      (-1.96) 
                  5.89*** 
                 (3.10) 
       -3.07*** 
      (-2.79) 
          5.82*** 
         (4.02) 
POLCON   
  -2.11*** 
      (-4.94) 
          2.82*** 
         (3.32) 
FEDCON   
        -1.17** 
       (-2.31) 
          0.94** 
         (2.15) 
COMMIT   
-0.71** 
       (-2.26) 
          1.11** 
         (2.08) 
CAMP   
       -2.83*** 
      (-4.28) 
          3.38*** 
         (3.10) 
MA   
 -0.39*** 
      (-3.24) 
         -0.23 
        (-1.48) 
MSA   
       -0.07** 
      (-2.35) 
          0.12*** 
         (3.62) 
DENOVO   
       0.25** 
      (2.41) 
          0.47 
         (1.52) 
PUBLIC   
      -0.13** 
     (-2.49) 
         0.09** 
        (2.36) 
HC   
       0.04 
      (0.63) 
         0.03 
        (0.82) 
QE   
       0.52 
      (1.28) 
         0.39 
        (0.94) 
TMTF   
       2.95*** 
      (3.41) 
        -3.05** 
      (-2.38) 
INF   
      0.17** 
     (1.99) 
         -0.19 
       (-1.24) 
GDP   
     -0.24** 
    (-2.38) 
        -0.07 
       (-1.20) 
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Pseudo 𝑅2 (%) 35.52 44.72 
# banks (n) 7,602 7,597 
 
 
 
 
   Table 5. In-sample estimation: Logit model 
This table reports the results from the in-sample estimation of the logit model as presented in Equation (10). 
The dependent variable equals to one if a bank fails (columns 1a and 2a), or if it is bailed out (columns 1b 
and 2b) and zero otherwise. The non-distressed banks constitute the holdout group in the estimation. The 
probabilities of failure and bailout are estimated separately and presented in columns 1a and 1b based on 
CAMELS components (capital strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), management expertise 
(MNGEXP1), earnings strength (EARN1), degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity to market risk 
(SENSRISK1)), and the indicators of systemic importance (bank size (SIZE), organisational complexity 
(ORGCOMPL), securitisation activity (SECASSET), and exposure to derivative products (DERIV)). In the 
estimations presented in columns 2a and 2b, we also account for the additional bank-specific factors (political 
connections (POLCON), connections with regulators (FEDCON), connections with House members 
(COMMIT), contributions to federal political campaigns (CAMP), acquirer banks in M&A transactions (MA), 
location in MSA or in a rural county (MSA), newly-chartered banks (DENOVO)), as well as for the 
environmental variables (quantitative easing (QE), Too-Many-To-Fail effect (TMTF), price level (INF), and 
economic growth (GDP)). All variables and their data sources are described in Appendix A. Observations are 
on bank level, constitute bank-quarter observations, and cover the entire data period, which extends from 
2003q1 to 2009q4. A constant term is included in the model, but is not reported in the table. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient values. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type of distress 
      Failure (1a)                Bailout (1b) Failure (2a) Bailout (2b) 
Variables     
CAP1 
       -1.59** 
      (-2.34) 
                 -1.37** 
                (-2.40) 
-1.60** 
      (-2.52) 
        -1.47*** 
       (-2.86) 
ASSETQLT1 
1.31** 
       (2.26) 
                  0.94 
                 (1.19) 
  1.10*** 
       (2.78) 
          0.74 
         (1.13) 
MNGEXP1 
       -2.20* 
      (-1.81) 
                  1.36 
                 (1.20) 
       -1.87** 
      (-2.08) 
          1.26 
         (1.24) 
EARN1 
       -1.29** 
      (-2.30) 
                 -1.87* 
                (-1.69) 
       -1.46*** 
      (-3.05) 
         -2.14* 
        (-1.80) 
LQDT1 
       -1.63* 
      (-1.85) 
                 -1.45* 
                (-1.72) 
       -1.22** 
      (-2.19) 
         -1.48** 
        (-1.96) 
SENSRISK1 
        1.17* 
       (1.80) 
                  1.26** 
                 (1.97) 
        0.93** 
       (2.04) 
          1.17** 
         (2.28) 
SIZE 
       -1.24*** 
      (-2.96) 
                  1.35** 
                 (2.32) 
       -1.33*** 
      (-3.79) 
          1.31*** 
         (3.41) 
ORGCOMPL 
       -0.58 
      (-1.30) 
                  0.94* 
                 (1.68) 
       -0.50* 
      (-1.71) 
          0.93* 
         (1.89) 
SECASSET 
       -1.98** 
      (-2.30) 
                  5.27* 
                 (1.84) 
       -2.12*** 
      (-2.74) 
          4.98** 
         (2.31) 
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DERIV 
       -3.36* 
      (-1.81) 
                  5.99** 
                 (2.24) 
       -3.02* 
      (-1.89) 
          5.86*** 
         (2.98) 
POLCON   
  -3.11*** 
      (-4.19) 
          3.55** 
         (2.51) 
FEDCON   
        -0.95** 
       (-1.98) 
          0.73* 
         (1.82) 
COMMIT   
-0.54** 
       (-2.00) 
          0.88* 
         (1.85) 
CAMP   
       -3.18*** 
      (-2.69) 
          2.76*** 
         (2.59) 
MA   
       -0.25** 
      (-2.11) 
         -0.18 
        (-1.19) 
MSA   
       -0.06* 
      (-1.85) 
          0.09** 
         (2.48) 
DENOVO   
       0.21* 
      (1.89) 
          0.50 
         (1.45) 
PUBLIC   
      -0.13** 
     (-2.18) 
         0.09* 
        (1.84) 
HC   
       0.06 
      (1.04) 
         0.03 
        (0.99) 
QE   
       0.52 
      (1.28) 
         0.39 
        (0.94) 
TMTF   
       3.27*** 
      (2.70) 
        -2.61** 
      (-2.07) 
INF   
      0.16* 
     (1.71) 
         -0.22 
        (-0.79) 
GDP   
     -0.20** 
    (-2.01) 
         -0.09 
        (-0.87) 
Pseudo 𝑅2(%) 19.98 21.04       26.78          27.90 
# banks (n) 7,602 7,602       7,597          7,597 
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Table 6. Out-of-sample decile forecasting accuracy test  
This table presents a comparison of the out-of-sample forecasting power between the dynamic competing risks 
hazard model and the logit model based on the decile forecasting accuracy test. Results rely on the complete 
model specification, that is, on the specification that, apart from the CAMELS components and the systemic 
indicators, also considers the additional bank-specific variables and the environmental factors. All banks are 
sorted into deciles each quarter from 2009q2 to 2009q4 based on the fitted probability values of the forecasting 
variables. Fitted probabilities are created by combining the coefficients from the two rival models estimated 
using 2003q1-2009q1 data with the data available in each subsequent quarter (i.e., 2009q2, 2009q3, and 
2009q4). The percentages of the correctly predicted failures and bailouts for both models, which are classified 
into each of the five highest probability deciles and into the least likely five deciles in the quarter in which 
banks actually failed or were bailed out are presented in Panels A and B, respectively. The correctly predicted 
number of failures and bailouts in each probability decile and the relevant cumulative probabilities are also 
reported in Panels A and B, respectively. The total number of failures in our sample is 167, and that of bailouts 
is 824.  
Panel A: Bank failures 
 Dynamic competing risks hazard model Logit model 
Decile Prob. (%) Cum Prob. 
(%) 
Failures Prob. (%) Cum Prob. 
(%) 
Failures 
1 63.90 63.90 107 41.10 41.10 69 
2 19.80 83.70 33 14.50 55.60 24 
3 5.10 88.80 9 16.80 72.40 28 
4 3.20 92.00 5 11.30 83.70 19 
5 2.40 94.40 4 6.20 89.90 10 
6-10 5.60 100.00 9 10.10 100.00 17 
   167   167 
Panel B: Bank bailouts 
 Dynamic competing risks hazard model Logit model 
Decile Prob. (%) Cum Prob. 
(%) 
Bailouts Prob. (%) Cum Prob. 
(%) 
Bailouts 
1 61.70 61.70 509 35.60 35.60 293 
2 18.60 80.30 153 11.90 47.50 98 
3 5.00 85.30 41 13.10 60.60 108 
4 4.10 89.40 34 19.50 80.10 161 
5 0.60 90.00 5 8.80 88.90 73 
6-10 10.00 100.00 82 11.10 100.00 91 
   824   824 
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Table 7a. In-sample estimation: Robustness checks 
Columns 1a and 1b report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of our dynamic competing 
risks hazard model (Equation 8) with two types of bank distress: failure and bailout. Columns 2a and 2b 
report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of the logit model (Equation 10). The dependent 
variable equals to one if a bank fails (columns 1a and 2a), or if it is bailed out (columns 1b and 2b) and zero 
otherwise. The non-distressed banks constitute the holdout group in all estimations. The nine banks of the 
first phase of TARP, and the largest failed bank are excluded from the estimations. The coefficients for the 
two types of distress are jointly estimated in the dynamic competing risks hazard model, while the 
coefficients in the logit model are estimated separately. The covariates include: the CAMELS components 
(capital strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), management expertise (MNGEXP1), earnings strength 
(EARN1), degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK1)); the indicators of 
systemic importance (bank size (SIZE), organisational complexity (ORGCOMPL), securitisation activity 
(SECASSET), and exposure to derivative products (DERIV)); the additional bank-specific factors (political 
connections (POLCON), connections with regulators (FEDCON), connections with House members 
(COMMIT), contributions to federal political campaigns (CAMP), acquirer banks in M&A transactions (MA), 
location in MSA or in a rural county (MSA), newly-chartered banks (DENOVO), listed banks (PUBLIC), and 
bank subsidiaries (HC)); and the set of environmental variables (quantitative easing (QE), Too-Many-To-Fail 
effect (TMTF), price level (INF), economic growth (GDP)). All variables and their data sources are described 
in Appendix A. Observations are on bank level, constitute bank-quarter observations, and cover the entire 
data period, which extends from 2003q1 to 2009q4. Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White t-statistics are 
reported below the estimated coefficient values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type of distress 
      Failure (1a)        Bailout (1b) Failure (2a) Bailout (2b) 
Variables     
CAP1 
 -1.61*** 
      (-3.74) 
        -1.32*** 
       (-3.91) 
-1.58** 
      (-2.45) 
        -1.30*** 
       (-2.80) 
ASSETQLT1 
  1.20*** 
       (3.48) 
          0.78 
         (1.46) 
  1.02*** 
       (2.71) 
          0.69 
         (1.05) 
MNGEXP1 
       -1.88** 
      (-2.47) 
          1.21 
         (1.52) 
       -1.79** 
      (-2.05) 
          1.33 
         (1.29) 
EARN1 
       -1.23*** 
      (-3.98) 
         -1.87** 
        (-2.26) 
       -1.39*** 
      (-2.94) 
         -2.07* 
        (-1.72) 
LQDT1 
       -1.36*** 
      (-2.72) 
         -1.10** 
        (-2.29) 
       -1.19** 
      (-2.15) 
         -1.35** 
        (-1.95) 
SENSRISK1 
0.79** 
       (2.28) 
          0.80** 
         (2.33) 
        0.82** 
       (2.00) 
          0.97** 
         (2.05) 
SIZE 
       -1.38*** 
      (-4.52) 
          1.01*** 
         (3.31) 
       -1.18*** 
      (-3.36) 
          0.86*** 
         (3.04) 
ORGCOMPL 
       -0.52* 
      (-1.79) 
          0.82** 
         (2.04) 
       -0.44* 
      (-1.68) 
          0.78* 
         (1.72) 
SECASSET 
       -1.99*** 
      (-3.65) 
          4.95*** 
         (2.96) 
       -1.86*** 
      (-2.67) 
          4.18** 
         (2.09) 
DERIV 
       -2.83*** 
      (-2.71) 
          4.79*** 
         (3.61) 
       -2.89* 
      (-1.78) 
          4.68*** 
         (2.70) 
POLCON 
  -2.14*** 
      (-5.02) 
          2.24*** 
         (2.96) 
  -3.18*** 
      (-4.23) 
          2.78** 
         (2.15) 
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FEDCON 
        -1.18** 
       (-2.34) 
          0.76** 
         (2.01) 
        -0.97** 
       (-2.05) 
          0.59* 
         (1.70) 
COMMIT 
-0.73** 
       (-2.30) 
          0.89** 
         (1.99) 
-0.55** 
       (-2.02) 
          0.72* 
         (1.73) 
CAMP 
       -2.80*** 
      (-4.23) 
          2.87*** 
         (2.90) 
       -3.09*** 
      (-2.68) 
          2.21** 
         (2.19) 
MA 
 -0.35*** 
      (-3.18) 
         -0.17 
        (-1.26) 
       -0.23** 
      (-2.07) 
         -0.14 
        (-0.96) 
MSA 
       -0.06** 
      (-2.29) 
          0.08*** 
         (2.97) 
       -0.05* 
      (-1.78) 
          0.06** 
         (2.15) 
DENOVO 
       0.27** 
      (2.43) 
          0.58 
         (1.60) 
       0.25* 
      (1.90) 
          0.59 
         (1.57) 
PUBLIC 
      -0.12** 
     (-2.45) 
         0.07** 
        (2.10) 
      -0.11** 
     (-2.12) 
         0.06* 
        (1.72) 
HC 
       0.04 
      (0.60) 
         0.02 
        (0.51) 
       0.05 
      (0.97) 
         0.02 
        (0.68) 
QE 
       0.54 
      (1.31) 
         0.42 
        (1.02) 
       0.53 
      (1.29) 
         0.44 
        (1.05) 
TMTF 
       2.89*** 
      (3.32) 
        -2.86** 
      (-2.19) 
       3.19*** 
      (2.68) 
        -2.38** 
      (-2.00) 
INF 
      0.18** 
     (2.02) 
         -0.20 
       (-1.32) 
      0.17* 
     (1.74) 
         -0.24 
        (-0.89) 
GDP 
     -0.26** 
    (-2.42) 
        -0.10 
       (-1.31) 
     -0.21** 
    (-2.06) 
         -0.11 
        (-1.08) 
Pseudo 𝑅2(%)                         42.61       25.04          25.59 
# banks (n)                         7,587       7,587          7,587 
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Table 7b. In-sample estimation: Robustness checks 
Columns 1a and 1b report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of our dynamic competing 
risks hazard model (Equation 8) with two types of bank distress: failure and bailout. Columns 2a and 2b 
report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of the logit model (Equation 10). The dependent 
variable equals to one if a bank fails (columns 1a and 2a), or if it is bailed out (columns 1b and 2b) and zero 
otherwise. The non-distressed banks constitute the holdout group in all estimations. All the banks that were 
involved in M&As as acquirers are excluded from the sample of distressed institutions: in total, 5 failed and 
224 bailed out banks are excluded. The coefficients for the two types of distress are jointly estimated in the 
dynamic competing risks hazard model, while the coefficients in the logit model are estimated separately. 
The covariates include: the CAMELS components (capital strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), 
management expertise (MNGEXP1), earnings strength (EARN1), degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity 
to market risk (SENSRISK1)); the indicators of systemic importance (bank size (SIZE), organisational 
complexity (ORGCOMPL), securitisation activity (SECASSET), and exposure to derivative products 
(DERIV)); the additional bank-specific factors (political connections (POLCON), connections with regulators 
(FEDCON), connections with House members (COMMIT), contributions to federal political campaigns 
(CAMP), acquirer banks in M&A transactions (MA), location in MSA or in a rural county (MSA), newly-
chartered banks (DENOVO), listed banks (PUBLIC), and bank subsidiaries (HC)); and the set of 
environmental variables (quantitative easing (QE), Too-Many-To-Fail effect (TMTF), price level (INF), 
economic growth (GDP)). All variables and their data sources are described in Appendix A. Observations are 
on bank level, constitute bank-quarter observations, and cover the entire data period, which extends from 
2003q1 to 2009q4. Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White t-statistics are reported below the estimated 
coefficient values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type of distress 
      Failure (1a)        Bailout (1b) Failure (2a) Bailout (2b) 
Variables     
CAP1 
 -1.54*** 
      (-3.69) 
        -1.18*** 
       (-3.36) 
-1.52** 
      (-2.39) 
        -1.04*** 
       (-2.65) 
ASSETQLT1 
  1.17*** 
       (3.38) 
          0.62 
         (1.17) 
  0.96*** 
       (2.68) 
          0.51 
         (0.84) 
MNGEXP1 
       -1.82** 
      (-2.40) 
          1.04 
         (1.22) 
       -1.75** 
      (-2.01) 
          1.11 
         (1.05) 
EARN1 
       -1.21*** 
      (-3.91) 
         -1.60** 
        (-2.02) 
       -1.32*** 
      (-2.84) 
         -1.83* 
        (-1.64) 
LQDT1 
       -1.31*** 
      (-2.70) 
         -0.96** 
        (-2.08) 
       -1.18** 
      (-2.11) 
         -1.09* 
        (-1.78) 
SENSRISK1 
0.77** 
       (2.24) 
          0.68** 
         (2.07) 
        0.79** 
       (1.99) 
          0.78** 
         (1.98) 
SIZE 
       -1.34*** 
      (-4.47) 
          0.82*** 
         (2.91) 
       -1.15*** 
      (-3.29) 
          0.71*** 
         (2.78) 
ORGCOMPL 
       -0.50* 
      (-1.76) 
          0.73** 
         (1.97) 
       -0.43* 
      (-1.65) 
          0.68* 
         (1.67) 
SECASSET 
       -1.94*** 
      (-3.58) 
          4.31*** 
         (2.70) 
       -1.80*** 
      (-2.59) 
          3.75** 
         (1.96) 
DERIV 
       -2.79*** 
      (-2.67) 
          4.11*** 
         (3.28) 
       -2.82* 
      (-1.75) 
          3.87** 
         (2.44) 
POLCON 
  -2.12*** 
      (-4.99) 
          1.87*** 
         (2.71) 
  -3.17*** 
      (-4.21) 
          2.18** 
         (1.99) 
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FEDCON 
        -1.17** 
       (-2.33) 
          0.67** 
         (1.96) 
        -0.96** 
       (-2.04) 
          0.51* 
         (1.65) 
COMMIT 
-0.70** 
       (-2.26) 
          0.79** 
         (1.97) 
-0.52** 
       (-1.99) 
          0.61* 
         (1.67) 
CAMP 
       -2.79*** 
      (-4.18) 
          2.74*** 
         (2.70) 
       -3.05*** 
      (-2.65) 
          1.98** 
         (2.02) 
MA 
 -0.32*** 
      (-3.11) 
         -0.10 
        (-1.05) 
       -0.19** 
      (-2.02) 
         -0.09 
        (-0.78) 
MSA 
       -0.06** 
      (-2.26) 
          0.05*** 
         (2.69) 
       -0.05* 
      (-1.74) 
          0.04** 
         (1.99) 
DENOVO 
       0.29** 
      (2.47) 
          0.70* 
         (1.68) 
       0.26* 
      (1.91) 
          0.68* 
         (1.67) 
PUBLIC 
      -0.11** 
     (-2.42) 
         0.04** 
        (1.99) 
      -0.10** 
     (-2.09) 
         0.03* 
        (1.66) 
HC 
       0.04 
      (0.58) 
         0.01 
        (0.39) 
       0.04 
      (0.91) 
         0.01 
        (0.44) 
QE 
       0.57 
      (1.33) 
         0.49 
        (1.15) 
       0.55 
      (1.30) 
         0.52 
        (1.23) 
TMTF 
       2.83*** 
      (3.29) 
        -2.67** 
      (-2.10) 
       3.15*** 
      (2.67) 
        -2.12** 
      (-1.96) 
INF 
      0.20** 
     (2.11) 
         -0.26 
       (-1.39) 
      0.19* 
     (1.82) 
         -0.29 
        (-1.01) 
GDP 
     -0.28** 
    (-2.45) 
        -0.15 
       (-1.38) 
     -0.23** 
    (-2.10) 
         -0.14 
        (-1.12) 
Pseudo 𝑅2(%)                         39.12       22.98          23.20 
# banks (n)                         7,368       7,368          7,368 
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Table 7c. In-sample estimation: Robustness checks 
Columns 1a and 1b report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of our dynamic competing 
risks hazard model (Equation 8) with two types of bank distress: failure and bailout. Columns 2a and 2b 
report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of the logit model (Equation 10). The dependent 
variable equals to one if a bank fails (columns 1a and 2a), or if it is bailed out (columns 1b and 2b) and zero 
otherwise. The non-distressed banks constitute the holdout group in all estimations. The coefficients for the 
two types of distress are jointly estimated in the dynamic competing risks hazard model, while the 
coefficients in the logit model are estimated separately. The covariates include: the CAMELS components 
(capital strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), management expertise (MNGEXP1), earnings strength 
(EARN1), degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK1)); the indicators of 
systemic importance (bank size (SIZE), organisational complexity (ORGCOMPL), securitisation activity 
(SECASSET), and exposure to derivative products (DERIV)); the additional bank-specific factors (political 
connections (POLCON), connections with regulators (FEDCON), connections with House members 
(COMMIT), contributions to federal political campaigns (CAMP), acquirer banks in M&A transactions (MA), 
location in MSA or in a rural county (MSA), newly-chartered banks (DENOVO), listed banks (PUBLIC), and 
bank subsidiaries (HC)); and the updated set of environmental variables (the target for the federal funds rate 
(FEDRATE), the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Too-Many-To-Fail effect (TMTF), market concentration 
(HHI), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve System (FRS), price level (INF), 
economic growth (GDP)). All variables and their data sources are described in Appendix A. Observations are 
on bank level, constitute bank-quarter observations, and cover the entire data period, which extends from 
2003q1 to 2009q4. Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White t-statistics are reported below the estimated 
coefficient values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type of distress 
      Failure (1a)       Bailout (1b) Failure (2a) Bailout (2b) 
Variables     
CAP1 
 -1.72*** 
      (-3.85) 
        -1.52*** 
       (-4.14) 
-1.64*** 
      (-2.59) 
        -1.50*** 
       (-2.92) 
ASSETQLT1 
  1.25*** 
       (3.49) 
          0.83 
         (1.49) 
  1.07*** 
       (2.73) 
          0.69 
         (1.04) 
MNGEXP1 
       -2.01** 
      (-2.54) 
          1.12 
         (1.56) 
       -1.90** 
      (-2.15) 
          1.37 
         (1.29) 
EARN1 
       -1.29*** 
      (-4.12) 
         -2.06** 
        (-2.51) 
       -1.52*** 
      (-3.12) 
         -2.22* 
        (-1.86) 
LQDT1 
       -1.38*** 
      (-2.71) 
         -1.18** 
        (-2.34) 
       -1.15** 
      (-2.09) 
         -1.45** 
        (-1.96) 
SENSRISK1 
0.83** 
       (2.38) 
          0.99*** 
         (2.65) 
        0.88** 
       (2.00) 
          1.11** 
         (2.19) 
SIZE 
       -1.55*** 
      (-5.01) 
          1.71*** 
         (4.63) 
       -1.40*** 
      (-3.97) 
          1.48*** 
         (3.68) 
ORGCOMPL 
       -0.65* 
      (-1.89) 
          1.12** 
         (2.24) 
       -0.52* 
      (-1.76) 
          1.02* 
         (1.92) 
SECASSET 
       -2.28*** 
      (-4.14) 
          6.28*** 
         (3.62) 
       -2.17*** 
      (-2.80) 
          5.06** 
         (2.38) 
DERIV 
       -3.11*** 
      (-2.89) 
          5.94*** 
         (4.10) 
       -3.09* 
      (-1.91) 
          6.03*** 
         (3.07) 
POLCON 
  -2.09*** 
      (-4.95) 
          2.86*** 
         (3.40) 
  -3.17*** 
      (-4.21) 
          3.59** 
         (2.54) 
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FEDCON 
        -1.21** 
       (-2.37) 
          0.95** 
         (2.17) 
        -1.00** 
       (-2.01) 
          0.75* 
         (1.86) 
COMMIT 
-0.76** 
       (-2.31) 
          1.18** 
         (2.16) 
-0.57** 
       (-2.02) 
          0.91* 
         (1.87) 
CAMP 
       -2.90*** 
      (-4.32) 
          3.44*** 
         (3.18) 
       -3.26*** 
      (-2.73) 
          2.80*** 
         (2.62) 
MA 
 -0.37*** 
      (-3.18) 
         -0.22 
        (-1.41) 
       -0.24** 
      (-2.00) 
         -0.16 
        (-1.09) 
MSA 
       -0.07** 
      (-2.30) 
          0.11*** 
         (3.53) 
       -0.06* 
      (-1.80) 
          0.08** 
         (2.36) 
DENOVO 
       0.24** 
      (2.35) 
          0.42 
         (1.41) 
       0.20* 
      (1.84) 
          0.46 
         (1.38) 
PUBLIC 
      -0.12** 
     (-2.41) 
         0.08** 
        (2.27) 
      -0.12** 
     (-2.09) 
         0.09* 
        (1.80) 
HC 
       0.03 
      (0.54) 
         0.03 
        (0.78) 
       0.06 
      (0.99) 
         0.03 
        (0.96) 
FEDRATE 
       1.09** 
      (2.08) 
        -0.84 
       (-1.20) 
       0.96* 
      (1.87) 
        -0.76 
       (-1.05) 
TAF 
       0.21* 
      (1.80) 
         0.03 
        (0.74) 
       0.17* 
      (1.68) 
         0.02 
        (0.61) 
TMTF 
       2.88*** 
      (3.34) 
        -2.92** 
      (-2.27) 
       3.18*** 
      (2.67) 
        -2.54** 
      (-2.03) 
HHI 
     -2.15*** 
    (-3.89) 
         1.40** 
        (2.31) 
     -1.78** 
    (-2.22) 
         1.23** 
        (2.01) 
OCC 
      1.33** 
     (2.37) 
          0.40 
        (1.18) 
      0.79** 
     (2.02) 
          0.28 
        (0.99) 
FRS 
      -0.28 
     (-0.56) 
         -0.18 
        (-0.69) 
      -0.07 
     (-0.55) 
         -0.09 
        (-0.72) 
INF 
      0.16** 
     (1.97) 
         -0.18 
       (-1.19) 
      0.15* 
     (1.67) 
        -0.21 
       (-0.73) 
GDP 
     -0.22** 
    (-2.30) 
        -0.07 
       (-1.12) 
     -0.19** 
    (-1.98) 
        -0.08 
       (-0.77) 
Pseudo 𝑅2(%)                         43.18       24.99        26.02 
# banks (n)                         7,589       7,589        7,589 
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Table 7d. In-sample estimation: Robustness checks 
Columns 1a and 1b report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of our dynamic competing 
risks hazard model (Equation 8) with two types of bank distress: failure and bailout. Columns 2a and 2b 
report the robustness results from the in-sample estimation of the logit model (Equation 10). The dependent 
variable equals to one if a bank fails (columns 1a and 2a), or if it is bailed out (columns 1b and 2b) and zero 
otherwise. The non-distressed banks constitute the holdout group in all estimations. All the 282 institutions 
that failed between 2010q1 and 2012q4 are added to the sample of non-distressed banks. The coefficients for 
the two types of distress are jointly estimated in the dynamic competing risks hazard model, while the 
coefficients in the logit model are estimated separately. The covariates include: the CAMELS components 
(capital strength (CAP1), asset quality (ASSETQLT1), management expertise (MNGEXP1), earnings strength 
(EARN1), degree of liquidity (LQDT1), and sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK1)); the indicators of 
systemic importance (bank size (SIZE), organisational complexity (ORGCOMPL), securitisation activity 
(SECASSET), and exposure to derivative products (DERIV)); the additional bank-specific factors (political 
connections (POLCON), connections with regulators (FEDCON), connections with House members 
(COMMIT), contributions to federal political campaigns (CAMP), acquirer banks in M&A transactions (MA), 
location in MSA or in a rural county (MSA), newly-chartered banks (DENOVO), listed banks (PUBLIC), and 
bank subsidiaries (HC)); and the set of environmental variables (quantitative easing (QE), Too-Many-To-Fail 
effect (TMTF), price level (INF), economic growth (GDP)). All variables and their data sources are described 
in Appendix A. Observations are on bank level, constitute bank-quarter observations, and cover the entire 
data period, which extends from 2003q1 to 2009q4. Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White t-statistics are 
reported below the estimated coefficient values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 Type of distress 
      Failure (1a)        Bailout (1b) Failure (2a) Bailout (2b) 
Variables     
CAP1 
 -1.41*** 
      (-3.20) 
        -1.48*** 
       (-4.01) 
-1.35** 
      (-2.12) 
        -1.43*** 
       (-2.81) 
ASSETQLT1 
  1.02*** 
       (2.95) 
          0.81 
         (1.50) 
0.78** 
       (2.26) 
          0.72 
         (1.09) 
MNGEXP1 
       -1.48** 
      (-2.11) 
          1.02 
         (1.38) 
       -1.43** 
      (-1.97) 
          1.22 
         (1.19) 
EARN1 
       -1.03*** 
      (-3.60) 
         -1.98** 
        (-2.40) 
       -1.04*** 
      (-2.68) 
         -1.98* 
        (-1.67) 
LQDT1 
       -1.10*** 
      (-2.59) 
         -1.17** 
        (-2.38) 
       -0.97** 
      (-1.99) 
         -1.45* 
        (-1.76) 
SENSRISK1 
0.62** 
       (2.01) 
          1.01*** 
         (2.67) 
        0.58* 
       (1.78) 
          1.14** 
         (2.21) 
SIZE 
       -1.27*** 
      (-4.38) 
          1.56*** 
         (4.29) 
       -1.08*** 
      (-3.21) 
          1.30*** 
         (3.37) 
ORGCOMPL 
       -0.49* 
      (-1.71) 
          1.05** 
         (2.15) 
       -0.40* 
      (-1.65) 
          0.89* 
         (1.85) 
SECASSET 
       -1.89*** 
      (-3.37) 
          6.02*** 
         (3.40) 
       -1.75** 
      (-2.48) 
          4.90** 
         (2.24) 
DERIV 
       -2.63** 
      (-2.52) 
          5.76*** 
         (3.95) 
       -2.78* 
      (-1.71) 
          5.83*** 
         (2.92) 
POLCON 
  -2.28*** 
      (-5.14) 
          3.05*** 
         (3.49) 
  -3.28*** 
      (-4.33) 
          3.72** 
         (2.54) 
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FEDCON 
        -1.24** 
       (-2.46) 
          1.02** 
         (2.24) 
        -1.03** 
       (-2.18) 
          0.79* 
         (1.86) 
COMMIT 
-0.75** 
       (-2.29) 
          1.14** 
         (2.11) 
-0.60** 
       (-2.05) 
          0.97* 
         (1.93) 
CAMP 
       -3.01*** 
      (-4.52) 
          3.49*** 
         (3.17) 
       -3.24*** 
      (-2.78) 
          2.82*** 
         (2.65) 
MA 
 -0.30*** 
      (-3.08) 
         -0.24 
        (-1.50) 
       -0.18** 
      (-2.00) 
         -0.18 
        (-1.20) 
MSA 
       -0.05** 
      (-2.19) 
          0.12*** 
         (3.64) 
       -0.04* 
      (-1.68) 
          0.10** 
         (2.51) 
DENOVO 
       0.34** 
      (2.51) 
          0.46 
         (1.50) 
       0.29* 
      (1.92) 
          0.49 
         (1.43) 
PUBLIC 
      -0.10** 
     (-2.39) 
         0.09** 
        (2.28) 
      -0.10** 
     (-2.06) 
         0.08* 
        (1.79) 
HC 
       0.03 
      (0.52) 
         0.03 
        (0.81) 
       0.04 
      (0.88) 
         0.03 
        (0.94) 
QE 
       0.61 
      (1.38) 
         0.42 
        (1.01) 
       0.57 
      (1.39) 
         0.45 
        (0.98) 
TMTF 
       2.96*** 
      (3.32) 
        -3.11** 
      (-2.46) 
       3.10*** 
      (2.74) 
        -2.78** 
      (-2.16) 
INF 
      0.22** 
     (2.14) 
         -0.20 
       (-1.31) 
      0.20* 
     (1.90) 
         -0.25 
        (-0.92) 
GDP 
     -0.29** 
    (-2.47) 
        -0.07 
       (-1.24) 
     -0.28** 
    (-2.15) 
         -0.10 
        (-0.97) 
Pseudo 𝑅2(%)                         36.14       20.75          22.08 
# banks (n)                         7,869       7,869          7,869 
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